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The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in
Sex Offender Registration Laws
Catherine L. Carpenter* and Amy E. Beverlin**
More is not always better. Consider sex offender registration laws. Initially anchored
by rational basis, registration schemes have spiraled out of control because legislators,
eager to please a fearful public, have been given unfettered freedom by a deferential
judiciary.
This Article does not challenge the state’s legislative power to enact sex offender
registration laws. Instead, this Article posits that, even if sex offender registration schemes
initially were constitutional, serially amended sex offender registration schemes—what
this Article dubs super-registration schemes—are not. Their emergence demands
reexamination of the traditionally held assumptions that defined original registration
laws as civil regulations.
Two intertwined causes are responsible for the schemes’ constitutional downfall. The
first is a legislative body eager to draft increasingly harsh registration and notification
schemes to please an electorate that subsists on a steady diet of fear. When combined
with the second cause, a Supreme Court that has yet to signal much-needed boundaries,
the ensuing consequence is runaway legislation that is no longer rationally connected to
its regulatory purpose. Ultimately, this Article is a cautionary tale of legislation that has
become unmoored from its constitutional grounding because of its punitive effect and
excessive reach.

* Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School. The authors wish to thank Dean Bryant Garth
and Vice Dean Austen Parrish of Southwestern Law School for their support of this scholarship. We
are also grateful for the valuable feedback we received from Professor Alexandra D’Italia and for the
research assistance of Tannaz Hashemi and Michael Morse.
** J.D. Candidate, Southwestern Law School, 2012. I would also like to thank Professor
Carpenter for the opportunity to collaborate with her on this piece and for her guidance throughout
the writing process.
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Excess: action that goes beyond a reasonable amount.
1
—Webster’s New World Dictionary and Thesaurus

Introduction
More is not always better. Consider sex offender registration laws.
Initially anchored by rational basis, registration schemes have spiraled
out of control because legislators, eager to please a fearful public, have
been given unfettered freedom by a deferential judiciary. It has been a
perfect storm of intersecting legislative action and judicial inaction that
has produced ever-escalating registration burdens. Set against this
backdrop, a new breed of law has emerged—what this Article terms
super-registration schemes—resulting from unchecked legislative action
spurred on by emotionally charged rhetoric.
If sex offender registration laws originally were designed to protect
2
the children of a community, then according to prevailing political
thought, harsher sex offender laws surely must protect children more
effectively. Unfortunately, that philosophy is neither accurate nor
constitutional: inaccurate for its reliance on unproven recidivism
3
4
statistics and false claims of security, and unconstitutional for its
1. Webster’s New World Dictionary and Thesaurus 214 (1996).
2. See infra notes 21–31 and accompanying text.
3. Some have criticized the blind adoption of statistics claiming that sex offenders recidivate at a
higher rate than do other types of offenders. See, e.g., Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics:
A Cautionary Tale of Criminal Laws That Have Swept the Country, 58 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 57–58 (2010)
(referencing Department of Justice statistics to rebut the claim that sex offenders recidivate at higher
rates); Wayne A. Logan, Megan’s Laws as a Case Study in Political Stasis, 61 Syracuse L. Rev. 371,
393–94 (2011) (explaining the various sociological and political factors that may account for the claim
of recidivism); Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame and the Law: An Economic Perspective on Megan’s Laws,
42 Harv. J. on Legis. 355, 382–83 (2005) (arguing that interpreting recidivism data is more complex
than generally acknowledged); Jane A. Small, Note, Who Are the People in Your Neighborhood? Due
Process, Public Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laws, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1451, 1457 (1999)
(identifying the flaws in adjudging recidivism rates of sex offenders).
4. A study commissioned by the Texas Senate Committee on Criminal Justice in 2010 concluded
that “[b]ased on the research [and] the testimony provided during the hearing, it is clear registries do
not provide the public safety, definitely not the way it is now.” S. Comm. on Crim. Justice, Interim
Report to 82nd Leg., S. Rep. No. 81, at 4 (Tex. 2010), available at http://www.senate.state.tx.us/
75r/senate/commit/c590/c590.InterimReport81.pdf. One need only review the tragic circumstance
surrounding the capture and seventeen-year imprisonment of Jaycee Dugard by convicted sex
offender Philip Garrido to appreciate that sex offender registration laws at most aid in the
apprehension of suspects, but do little to protect children. See Marisol Bello, Questions Arise on
Monitoring of Sex Offenders, USA Today, Sept. 2, 2009, at A3 (observing ironically that Phillip
Garrido was able to keep Jaycee Dugard captive for so long despite the fact that “[e]very April 5 for
the past 10 years, Phillip Garrido registered on his birthday . . . as a convicted sex offender”); Maura
Dolan, Federal Parole Officials Released Phillip Garrido from 50-year Sentence After Short Interview,
L.A. Times, Sept. 5, 2009, at A9 (reporting that Phillip Garrido was on parole and subject to regular
inspections and visits by his parole officers during the time that Jaycee Dugard remained his captive);
see also Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty
Deprivation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 788, 853–54 (1996) (arguing that notification laws create a false sense of security in the
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excessive and punitive effect. Like “piling on” penalties in football that
5
can nullify clean tackles, serially amended sex offender registration
6
schemes are faltering under their own weight and ambition.
This Article posits that two intertwined causes are responsible for
these schemes’ constitutional downfall. The first is a legislative body
eager to draft increasingly harsh registration and notification schemes to
please an electorate that subsists on a steady diet of fear. When
combined with the second cause, a Supreme Court that has yet to signal
much-needed boundaries, the ensuing consequence is runaway
legislation that has become unmoored from its initial constitutional
grounding.
Despite significant changes to registration schemes over the past
several years, courts and legislative bodies continue to rely on two
Supreme Court opinions from the 2003 term to define the parameters of
constitutionality in sex offender registration laws. In Smith v. Doe, the
Court grappled with whether registration schemes violated ex post facto
principles by requiring retroactive application to offenders convicted
7
prior to the enactment of the laws. And in Connecticut Department of
Public Safety v. Doe, the Court addressed whether procedural due
process demands that we afford convicted sex offenders the opportunity
to be heard as to the level of danger they pose before their information is
8
disseminated to the community.
In both cases, the Court upheld, albeit on different bases, the
constitutionality of sex offender registration schemes as civil regulations,
leaving them unencumbered by the substantive and procedural
requirements traditionally associated with criminal laws. Smith held that
because sex offender registration laws are regulatory in nature, the
9
constitutional ex post facto principle is inapplicable, while Connecticut
Department of Public Safety determined that procedural due process did

community because of the inherent voluntariness of the system).
5. See James Alder, About Football Glossary—Piling On, About.com, http://football.about.com/
cs/football101/g/gl_pilingon.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2012) (“An illegal play where several players
jump on the player with the ball after he's been tackled.”).
6. Several recent state court decisions have declared super-registration schemes unconstitutional
because of their excessive and overinclusive nature. See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009)
(concluding that Indiana’s amended scheme violates constitutional principles); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d
4, 26 (Me. 2009) (concluding that the state’s new registration scheme violates ex post facto principles);
State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011) (ruling that sections of the state’s sex offender laws
unconstitutionally increase the punishment for crimes committed before the law took effect). Apart from
the potential constitutional infirmities, the new sex offender registration schemes come with an exorbitant
pricetag and are proving very difficult to enact and enforce. See Emanuella Grinberg, 5 Years Later, States
Struggle to Comply with Federal Sex Offender Law, CNN.com (July 28, 2011, 11:51 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/CRIME/07/28/sex.offender.adam.walsh.act/index.html?hpt=hp_c2.
7. 538 U.S. 84, 89 (2003).
8. 538 U.S. 1, 1 (2003).
9. 538 U.S. at 105.
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not require individualized assessment for the dissemination of
10
registrants’ information to the community. Together, the decisions
impart a striking message: Sex offender registration laws will be allowed
to flourish as valid regulatory measures despite their intrusive impact.
It is only human nature—indeed it is the best of political nature—
that left unchecked, drafters will test constitutional boundaries with ever11
broadening legislation. It is not surprising, then, that these interrelated
decisions gave politicians an implicit “green light” to ramp up
registration and notification requirements. Even the Court’s decisions in
12
13
Carr v. United States and Reynolds v. United States will do little to
dampen this message. Although Carr limited the reach of the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act’s (“SORNA”) “failure to
14
register” law to offenders who traveled interstate after SORNA’s
15
enactment, and Reynolds defined the role of the Attorney General to
16
specify which pre-Act offenders must comply with SORNA, neither
case addressed whether SORNA is punitive in nature or in effect.
Instead, both decisions framed the inquiry into SORNA around narrow
17
questions of congressional intent. Parsing language to determine the
18
reach of “failure to register” and to define the authority of the Attorney
19
General to implement SORNA enabled the Court to avoid the
fundamental question of whether ex post facto principles are violated by
the arguably punitive nature of registration schemes. Therefore, even

10. 538 U.S at 8 (“States are not barred by principles of ‘procedural due process’ from drawing
such classifications.” (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120 (1989) (plurality opinion))).
11. An interesting example of swelling unchecked legislation can be found in the number of strict
liability offenses, which has grown considerably since such offenses were first codified in the midnineteenth century. See Eric A. Degroff, The Application of Strict Criminal Liability to Maritime Oil
Pollution Incidents: Is There OPA for the Accidental Spiller?, 50 Loy. L. Rev. 827, 841–843 (2004)
(tracing the significant expansion of strict liability offenses). Only recently did the Supreme Court
squash the proliferation. See John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness:
Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1021, 1022–23 (1999) (examining recent
decisions to conclude that the Court has reinvoked the importance of moral culpability, and therefore
mens rea, as a necessary component of a conviction).
12. 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010).
13. 132 S. Ct. 975 (2012).
14. Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 141(a)(1), 120 Stat. 587, 601–04 (2006) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2010)). Some states have adopted the “SORNA” acronym for their registration and
notification statutes. As the Court explained in Carr, § 2250 subjects to criminal penalties “any person
who (1) ‘is required to register under [SORNA]’, (2) ‘travels in interstate or foreign commerce,’ and
(3) ‘knowingly fails to register or update a registration.’” 130 S. Ct. at 2232.
15. 130 S. Ct. at 2241.
16. 132 S. Ct at 978.
17. Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 980 (exploring whether SORNA applies to pre-Act offenders before
the Attorney General so determines); Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2241 (examining whether the failure-toregister criminal penalties applied to offenders whose interstate travel occurred prior to SORNA’s
enactment).
18. Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2234–37.
19. Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 980–82.
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taking into account the contribution of Carr and Reynolds to the
discussion, a natural outgrowth of the Court’s jurisprudence is what we
have today: a second generation of sex offender statutes more
burdensome and stigmatizing than its parent.
Part I of this Article examines the current state of sex offender
legislation. It traces the growth of sex offender registration laws and
community notification statutes after Smith v. Doe and Connecticut
Department of Public Safety. Expansion includes more significant
affirmative reporting obligations, a corresponding increase in the level
and intensity of community notification, and, most important, the
systematic elimination of individualized risk assessment. Part II reviews
the case law and theories that guide a court’s determination as to whether
a law is a civil regulation or a criminal statute cloaked in civil rhetoric. Part
II further explains the consequences of such determinations.
The balance of the Article explores the pervasive theme of
excessiveness and its impact on the constitutionality of super-registration
schemes. Part III analyzes today’s sex offender schemes under ex post
facto principles to determine whether the assumptions that controlled in
Smith v. Doe continue to have vitality. This Part concludes that new
assumptions dominate super-registration schemes, which recast these
schemes as criminal penalties cloaked in civil disguise. Part IV makes the
case that excessive legislation results in both substantive and procedural
due process violations because registrants have been deprived of
profound liberty interests under this generation of registration laws.
If one observation can be made, it is this: Judicial deference to
legislative authority is no longer an appropriate response to everharshening registration schemes. Despite the disapproval and fear that
sex offenders generate in the community, the judiciary’s role must be to
support and preserve foundational constitutional principles “without
20
respect to persons.” Without judicial intervention to set boundaries,
legislators will continue to respond to the community’s collective fear
with expanding laws that punish the sex offender. That is why Part V,
entitled “Enough is Enough,” heralds three state supreme courts that
have filled the judicial silence with eloquent opinions that recognize the
punitive nature of these serially amended schemes.

I. A Race to the Harshest: A Snapshot of the New Generation of
Sex Offender Registration Laws
21
22
Separate incidents involving three young children—Adam, Jacob,
23
and Megan —each of whom was abducted and murdered, coalesced in a

20. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2010) (“Oaths of Justices and Judges”).
21. Six-year-old Adam Walsh was abducted and murdered in 1981. The Adam Walsh Story, Nat’l
Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/
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24

national conversation on crimes against children. The accounts are well
known, but they are still heartbreaking to hear. Spearheaded by grieving
25
families, the conversation transformed into political action and resulted
in a myriad of legislation including the passage of the Jacob Wetterling
Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration
26
Act (“SORA”). The Act required each of the fifty states to adopt sex
offender registration laws within three years of the Act’s passage in order
27
to receive federal law enforcement funding. The first generation of sex
offender laws passed in response to SORA “was designed as a tool solely
for law enforcement agencies, and registry records were kept
28
confidential.” In 1996, under its famous moniker “Megan’s Law,”
Congress amended the Jacob Wetterling Act to include the
dissemination of registration information to the community through
29
community notification statutes.

PageServlet?PageId=1156 (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). Adam’s father, John Walsh, established the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children in response to Adam’s death. About John Walsh,
America’s Most Wanted, http://www.amw.com/about_amw/john_walsh.cfm (last visited Mar. 17, 2012).
22. Eleven-year-old Jacob Wetterling was abducted at gunpoint in front of his friends in 1989 and
was never found. How We Began and the Need for Transition, Jacob Wetterling Resource Ctr.,
http://www.jwrc.org/WhoWeAre/History/tabid/128/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2012).
23. Seven-year-old Megan Kanka was sexually assaulted and murdered in 1994 by Jesse
Timmendequas, a neighbor who, unbeknownst to Megan’s family, had prior convictions for sexual
assault against children. State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 66–73 (N.J. 1999).
24. See, e.g., Manuel Mendoza, Nation Responds to Adam Re-Airing, Miami News, May 1, 1984,
at 5A (reporting the flood of tips on missing children after the airing of Adam Walsh’s disappearance);
Bud Newman, Missing Children Center Like a Dream for Walsh, Palm Beach Post, Apr. 19, 1984, at
A2 (announcing the opening of the National Center on Missing and Exploited Children); see also
Steve Irsay, The Search for Jacob, CNN.com (Nov. 26, 2002, 7:25 PM), http://archives.cnn.com/
2002/LAW/11/19/ctv.wetterling/index.html (recounting theories on the abduction Jacob Wetterling).
25. For an account of the contribution each family made to the passage of registration and
notification laws, see Carpenter, supra note 3, at 19–21.
26. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006)) (repealed 2006) (establishing federal guidelines for state sex offender
registration laws). Some states have adopted the “SORA” acronym for their registration and
notification statutes.
27. Id. § 170101(g). States that did not comply were faced with a decrease in federal funding. See
id. Although congressional action provided the final push for nationwide sex offender legislation,
there were a few states that passed sex offender registration laws much earlier. See Abril R. Bedarf,
Comment, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 885, 887 n.4
(1995) (noting that the first states to introduce sex offender registration laws were Alabama, Arizona,
California, Illinois, and Nevada, all between 1947 and 1967).
28. Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2007) (relating the history of
SORA).
29. Pub. L. No. 104-145, § 2, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071
(2010)). The act provided that the designated state law enforcement agency “shall release relevant
information that is necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person required to register
under this section.” Id. So strong was the public’s reaction to the Kankas’ call for reform, that New
Jersey passed the first Megan’s Law just three months after Megan’s murder. See E.B. v. Verniero,
119 F.3d 1077, 1081–82 (3d Cir. 1997).
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However, SORA was only the beginning. In 2006, Congress passed
30
the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (“AWA”).
31
Encompassed in the AWA is SORNA, which includes a set of
regulations, penalties, and punishments for sex offenders, and a
32
comprehensive national system for their registration.
Passage of SORNA redefined the landscape. The ensuing years
have been marked by a dizzying array of increased registration and
community notification requirements, the emergence of harshening
residency restrictions, and the elimination of individuated risk
33
assessment. Although jurists and scholars alike decried aspects of the
34
original sex offender registration schemes, in retrospect, those laws
35
were tame by comparison to SORNA and its progeny.

30. Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and
42 U.S.C. (2010)). The Act has been the subject of considerable scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Steven J.
Costigliacci, Protecting Our Children from Sex Offenders: Have We Gone Too Far?, 46 Fam. Ct. Rev.
180, 183–84 (2008) (criticizing the lack of flexibility in determining registrants’ status under the AWA);
David A. Singleton, Sex Offender Residency Statutes and the Culture of Fear: The Case for More
Meaningful Rational Basis Review of Fear-Driven Public Safety Laws, 3 U. St. Thomas L.J. 600, 628
(2006) (arguing that residency restrictions have not been proven effective); Brittany Enniss, Note,
Quickly Assuaging Public Fear: How the Well-Intended Adam Walsh Act Led to Unintended
Consequences, 2008 Utah L. Rev. 697, 706–08 (noting that the AWA, enacted to protect minors, has
harmed juvenile offenders who have been subject to its provisions); Emily A. White, Note,
Prosecutions Under the Adam Walsh Act: Is America Keeping Its Promise?, 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
1783, 1792–93 nn.64–66 (2008) (noting a split among district courts regarding the retroactive
applicability of provisions of the AWA).
31. Pub. L. No. 109-248, tit. I, 120 Stat. 590 (2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–
16929 (2010)). SORNA established “the Jacob Wetterling, Megan Nicole Kanka, and Pam Lychner
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Program,” immortalizing three of the most notable victims
of sex offenders. See 42 U.S.C. § 16902 (2010).
32. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911–16929 (2010). A brief overview of SORNA’s most basic requirements
should paint a sufficient picture of the regulations put into effect. SORNA requires every sex offender
to register in the jurisdictions where the offender lives, works, and goes to school. Id. § 16913(a).
Registration includes the provision of specified information to law enforcement, which will be
included in the jurisdiction’s sex offender registry, for a period of fifteen years to life depending on the
level of the offender. Id. §§ 16914(a), 16915(a). The Act authorizes the Attorney General to collect
certain Internet-related information, as determined by the Attorney General, to be included in a
federal registry. See id. §§ 16914(a)(7), 16915(a). SORNA also requires that every jurisdiction provide
for a criminal penalty that includes a maximum term of imprisonment that is greater than one year for
a failure to comply with the registration requirements espoused in the Act. Id. § 16913(e). SORNA
requires each jurisdiction to make the registry information available to the public on the Internet. Id.
§ 16918. The Act also established a national sex offender registry, which is accessible by the public via
a website. Id. §§ 16919–16920.
33. Courts have acknowledged the substantial changes to sex offender registration schemes. See,
e.g., Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 374–77 (Ind. 2009) (recounting the numerous changes to the
federal and Indiana sex offender registration schemes); see also State v. Henry, 228 P.3d 900, 903–05
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (providing a detailed history of amendments to Arizona’s offender schemes);
State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 8–11 (Me. 2009) (detailing the extensive amendments to Maine’s
registration scheme); Doe v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882, 894 (D. Neb. 2010) (discussing the impact
of two 2009 amendments to Nebraska’s sex offender registration laws); State v. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d
753, 757–60 (Ohio 2010) (detailing the amendments to Ohio’s sex offender registration scheme).
34. For examples of judicial criticism, see Doe v. Pryor, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1226 (M.D. Ala.
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The revised registration schemes include an ever-increasing number
of registerable offenses, lengthening durational requirements, expanded
personal information reporting requirements, harsher residency
restrictions, the introduction of the GPS tracking device, and the
36
systematic elimination of individualized assessment as a touchstone.
One embodiment of the super-registration scheme is California’s
37
Jessica’s Law, the highly trumpeted ballot measure that was passed by
38
39
California voters in 2006. Acknowledged on both the ballot measure
40
and in subsequent case law as the toughest in the country, Jessica’s Law
expanded the list of registerable offenses and made more stringent
41
reporting requirements and notification procedures.

1999) (characterizing Alabama’s registration scheme as “among the . . . most restrictive of such laws in
the nation”); Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[T]he registration provisions of
the Act place a ‘tangible burden’ on plaintiffs, potentially for the rest of their lives.”); Doe v. Dep’t of
Pub. Safety, 92 P.3d 398, 409–10 (Alaska 2004) (reiterating the burdensome nature of Alaska’s
registration requirements); State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205, 1213 (Fla. 2004) (recognizing that
Florida’s statute “imposes more than a stigma,” subjecting designated sexual predators to “life-long
registration requirements”); State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1041 (Kan. 1996) (“The practical effect of
such unrestricted dissemination could make it impossible for the offender to find housing or
employment.”). For scholarly criticism, see, for example, Bedarf, supra note 27, at 939; Earl-Hubbard,
supra note 4, at 826 (“Although the registration laws have a regulatory purpose, the laws cause
offenders to suffer a disability that is so punitive as to negate this regulatory intent.”); Wayne A.
Logan, A Study in “Actuarial Justice”: Sex Offender Classification Practice and Procedure, 3 Buff.
Crim. L. Rev. 593, 593–95 (2000) (disputing the assumption that sex offenders recidivate at higher
rates); see also Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in Sex Offender
Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 295, 299 (2006) (challenging the inclusion of strict liability sex
offenses in registration schemes).
35. See Corey Rayburn Yung, One of These Laws Is Not Like the Others: Why the Federal Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act Raises New Constitutional Questions, 46 Harv. J. on Legis.
369, 370–71 (2009) (contending that SORNA’s provisions must be amended to meet constitutional
muster).
36. See infra Part I.
37. Jessica’s Law is named in memory of nine-year-old Jessica Lunsford, who was raped and
murdered by John Couey, a convicted sex offender. See Terry Aguayo, Sex Offender Guilty of Rape
and Murder of Florida Girl, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 2007, at A15.
38. See Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act: Jessica’s Law, Prop. 83, § 22, 2006 Cal.
Legis. Serv. 2155 (West) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Cal. Penal Code).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., People v. Mosley, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 321, 332 (Ct. App. 2010) (listing the “dozens of
changes to the laws” concerning the registration and notification schemes).
41. Id. The passage of Jessica’s Law sparked controversy and invoked scrutiny. Shortly after the
law was approved by California voters, a federal judge issued a temporary injunction against the
retroactive enforcement of the law’s residency restrictions. Jenifer Warren, Judge Blocks Part of Sex
Offender Law, L.A. Times, Nov. 9, 2006, at A32. The law’s sponsors, however, did not intend for those
restrictions to apply retroactively. See id.; see also Bill Ainsworth, Law Creates Homeless Parolees,
Report Says—Sex Offenders Limited by Residency Rules, San Diego Union-Tribune, Feb. 22, 2008, at
A1 (observing that residency restrictions imposed by Jessica’s Law have caused many sex offenders in
California to become homeless). Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court ruled that the residency
restrictions can be applied retroactively to offenders who committed their crimes before the law
passed but were paroled after it took effect. In re E.J., 223 P.3d 31, 38–40 (Cal. 2010).
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Registration schemes like Jessica’s Law have been propelled into
passage by the public’s fear of the stereotypic image of the sex
42
offender—the violent pedophile on the lookout for small children.
Unfortunately, that singular perception ignores the reality that sex
offender statutes stigmatize wide-ranging actions and apply to broad
segments of the population. Although the cast of characters may change,
countless cases relay stories of offenders, no longer dangerous, struggling
to maintain stability in lives governed by ever-evolving and increasingly
stringent legislation.
The face of registration includes Dean Edgar Weisart, who was
convicted of indecent exposure for skinny-dipping with his girlfriend in a
hotel pool in 1979 and then required to register more than twenty years
43
later. It contemplates offenders such as Ricky Blackmun, whose family
moved to Oklahoma from Iowa for a fresh start after Ricky was
convicted as an adult sex offender for having sex with a thirteen-year-old
44
girl when he was sixteen. Even though Ricky’s record was expunged in
Iowa, he was required to register as a tier III sex offender—the highest
level—in Oklahoma until a change in the law terminated his duty to
45
register. Registration rolls are also populated by children—adjudicated
juvenile offenders who, despite their ages, face the same burdensome
46
registration requirements for certain offenses as do convicted adults.
The face of registration also comprises offenders displaced from
47
their homes because of onerous residency restrictions. In New York, a
seventy-seven-year-old convicted offender living in Manhattan was
banished from his residence of some forty years because of amended
48
New York residency restrictions. In South Florida, numerous convicted
offenders live under the Julia Tuttle Causeway, a large bridge, because
there is no community in South Florida where they may reside without
49
violating residency restrictions. In Georgia, Anthony Mann, a registered

42. This image is seared into everyone’s minds because of the tragic death of Megan Kanka, who
was killed by a violent pedophile. See supra notes 22–23.
43. See Wiesart v. Stewart, 665 S.E.2d 187, 187–88 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008); see also State v. Chun, 76
P.3d 935, 935–36, 942 (Haw. 2003) (concluding that the offense of Llewelyn Chun, a husband and
father who pled no contest to indecent exposure and was required to register, was not registrationworthy because it did not entail “criminal sexual conduct”).
44. Emanuella Grinberg, No Longer a Registered Sex Offender, but the Stigma Remains,
CNN.com (Feb. 11, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-02-11/justice/oklahoma.teen.sex.offender_1_
offender-registry-oklahoma-label.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058 (Del. 2001) (holding that registration and community
notification requirements are constitutional as applied to juveniles); In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747 (Ill.
2003) (affirming lifetime registration for an adjudicated juvenile offender); In re Welfare of J.R.Z,
648 N.W.2d 241, 247–48 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding lifetime registration for an eleven-year-old).
47. For a description of the changes in residency restrictions, see infra Part I.D.
48. Berlin v. Evans, 923 N.Y.S.2d 828, 828 (Sup. Ct. 2011).
49. Catharine Skipp & Arian Campo-Flores, A Bridge Too Far, Newsweek, Aug. 3, 2009, at 46;
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sex offender, was prohibited from entering the restaurant he half owned
and ran because child-care facilities located themselves within 1000 feet
50
of Mann’s business.
These are the casualties of a system that at the outset was intended
to protect the public from dangerous offenders but that has evolved into
the politically motivated pursuit of harsher laws designed to satisfy a
51
fearful public. Unfortunately, in that pursuit, these laws have become
excessively punitive and, consequently, are no longer rationally connected
52
to their regulatory purpose.

A. Growing Number of Registerable Offenses
Since the 1990s, registration-worthy sex offenses have grown
dramatically in number and scope. For example, in 1994, when the
Indiana General Assembly adopted Zachary’s Law, the state’s first
registration scheme (named in honor of ten-year-old Zachary Snider,
53
who was molested and murdered by a convicted molester), a mere eight
54
crimes triggered registration. Currently, Zachary’s Law lists forty
offenses that trigger registration: twenty-one offenses trigger registration
55
as a “sex or violent offender” and an additional nineteen offenses
see Catharine Skipp, A Law for the Sex Offenders Under a Miami Bridge, Time (Feb. 1, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1957778,00.html.
50. Mann v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 742 (Ga. 2007) (finding Georgia’s residency
restrictions unconstitutional only insofar as they permitted the regulatory taking of the defendant’s
home without just compensation).
51. Much has been written on the public’s fear and commensurate desire for harsher
punishments. See Wayne A. Logan, Knowledge as Power: Criminal Registration and Community
Notification Laws in America 85–108 (2009) (exploring the social and political catalysts for the
proliferation of registration schemes); Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with It? The Political,
Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal
Law, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 23 (1997) (examining the reasons why the public favors harsh punishments
in the face of countervailing evidence); Singleton, supra note 30, at 602–07 (arguing that an increase in
crime reporting in the media induced the proliferation of sex offender registration laws); see also
William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 781 (2006)
(contending that the harsh justice of the 1970s was a response to the “constitutional proceduralism” of
the 1960s).
52. See Carpenter, supra note 3, at 51–55 (arguing that the increasing harshness of registration
schemes is tied to a political desire to push offenders from their communities before adjoining
communities do the same). Although the legislative intent behind registration schemes is often
characterized as remedial in nature, the emotional charge prompting the legislation sometimes is not.
See, e.g., Doe v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882 (D. Neb. 2010) (acknowledging that the sponsoring
legislator expressed rage and revulsion toward convicted offenders).
53. See Overview of Zachary’s Law, Allen County Sheriff (Jan. 5, 2011),
http://www.allencountysheriff.org/sexoffender/zachary.html (providing the background of the passage
of Zachary’s Law). For a review of the rise of personalized legislation and specifically naming
legislation in honor of children victims, see Carpenter, supra note 3, at 23–34 (suggesting that the
names are an effective marketing technique based on their simplicity and emotional power).
54. See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 375 (Ind. 2009) (detailing the historical development of
registerable offenses in Indiana); see also State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 8–11 (Me. 2009).
55. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-5, -7 (2011), invalidated by Wallace, 905 N.E.2d 371.
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56

trigger registration as a “sex offender.” Other states have similar
trajectories, with some registration schemes adding as many as forty
57
registration-worthy offenses to their initial legislation.
In addition, some states have introduced “discretionary registration,”
which permits courts to require registration where mandatory
58
59
registration is otherwise not required or not allowed. In People v.
Picklesimer, for example, the State conceded that the defendant’s oral
copulation with a seventeen-year-old girl was “voluntary,” and that his
conviction therefore could not support mandatory registration under
60
existing California law. However, the State successfully argued that the
defendant’s conviction supported the trial court’s decision to impose
discretionary lifetime registration under California’s sex offender
61
statute. Indeed, the watchword appears to be “discretionary,” as
legislative enactments specifically rest discretion as to a number of legal
62
points with one of the federal or state government branches.
Commensurate with the increase in the number of offenses is their
shifting classification. To be sure, reclassification is not merely a case of
semantics. When a crime is reclassified as more dangerous, so, too, is the

56. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-4.5, invalidated by Wallace, 905 N.E.2d 371.
57. See, e.g., Letalien, 985 A.2d at 8 (discussing Maine’s first registration scheme, which limited
the class of registrants to only those persons who had been convicted of gross sexual assault involving
a victim who was under sixteen years of age at the time of the commission of the crime). Compare
Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1247 n.1 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that Utah’s registration scheme at
that time listed nineteen triggering offenses), with Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-21.5(g), (n) (2011) (listing
twenty-nine registerable offenses); see also La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:541(24)(a) (2011) (listing twentysix offenses that qualify as sexual offenses, including voyeurism and video voyeurism); N.Y. Correct.
Law § 168-a (2011) (cataloguing over forty registerable offenses in New York).
58. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 290.006 (2011) (providing for discretionary registration where
“the court finds at the time of conviction or sentencing that the person committed the offense as a
result of sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification”); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 15:544(E)(1) (2011) (permitting a court to impose lifetime registration after a contradictory hearing);
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:544(E)(1) (stating that the district attorney and the offender may enter into a
plea agreement whereby the offender will be subject to lifetime registration without a contradictory
hearing).
59. See, e.g., People v. Picklesimer, 226 P.3d 348, 357 (Cal. 2010) (explaining that mandatory
registration for those convicted of oral copulation with a minor is unconstitutional under California
case law, but that discretionary registration is not).
60. Id. at 356 (citing People v. Hofsheier, 129 P.3d 29 (Cal. 2006)).
61. Id. at 357. The California Supreme Court determined that there was “no constitutional bar to
having a judge exercise his or her discretion to determine whether [one convicted of a crime] should
continue to be subject to registration.” Id. at 358; see United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1352–53
(11th Cir. 2010) (reasoning that because of the expansive language used in SORNA, the Act allows the
imposition of registration requirements for offenses not specifically enumerated).
62. See United States v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing Congress’s
delegation to the Attorney General of the power to determine whether SORNA applied retroactively
and, if so, whether it applied retroactively to juveniles); State v. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d 753, 759–60 (Ohio
2010) (criticizing Ohio’s statutory scheme, which authorized the attorney general alone to reclassify
offenders already classified by the court); see also Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.550(1) (2011) (affording
discretion to public agencies to determine “relevant and necessary” release of information).
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63

individual convicted of that crime. Upward reclassification increases
registration and notification burdens, and reclassification affects both
future offenders and those previously convicted and classified as less
64
dangerous. Consequently, burdens associated with the reclassification
are being applied retroactively to convicted offenders who were deemed
65
a lower risk under previous registration schemes. Although it is within
66
legislative purview to alter or expand legislation, in the absence of
scientific evidence or other proof to explain the reclassification, the shift
can be viewed as simply another example of legislative hunger in action.
Particularly disconcerting is the fact that revised classifications are
often made without individualized assessment of the convicted offender’s
67
level of dangerousness. And even when a reclassification hearing is
statutorily authorized, it does not ensure procedural due process because
68
often the hearing is not held, or if it is held, it is administered in a
69
cursory fashion that calls into question the hearing’s legitimacy.
Under Ohio’s prevailing registration scheme, for example, a
previously convicted offender’s level of dangerousness could be
reclassified upward solely upon the legislature’s decision to reclassify the
crime; it could not be based on a judicial determination of the
dangerousness of the offender or upon a finding that the offense itself
70
was of particular danger. So troubling was this apparent usurpation of
63. See, e.g., Lemmon v. Harris, 949 N.E.2d 803, 804–05 (Ind. 2011) (stating that the defendant,
who originally was required to register for ten years, was later notified that his conviction had been
reclassified to require registration for life); State v. Ortega-Martinez, 2011-Ohio-2540U, ¶¶ 1–2 (Ct.
App.) (noting that upon reclassification of its registration scheme in Ohio, convicted sex offender
Ortega-Martinez’s classification changed from lowest level of risk offense to tier II offender with the
commensurate increase in registration and notification requirements); State v. Poling, 2011-Ohio-3201U,
¶ 7 (Ct. App.) (registrant’s reporting requirements changed from annual to once every ninety days).
64. See, e.g., Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384, 389 (Ind. 2009) (explaining that the defendant had
been reclassified from a “sex offender,” who must register for ten years, to a “sexually violent
predator,” who must register for life).
65. See id.; see also Hannah v. State, 2011-Ohio-2930U (Ct. App.) (reviewing the reclassification
of seven tier I offenders to tier III status); Ortega-Martinez, 2011-Ohio-2540U, ¶¶ 1–2.
66. See, e.g., Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d at 766 (acknowledging the Legislature’s authority to enact or
amend sex offender registration laws).
67. For example, reclassification in Ohio is statutorily authorized to be administered by the
attorney general alone, and therefore occurs without any individualized assessment or expert
testimony. See id. ¶ 22.
68. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 2009-1765U, p. 7 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/26/10) (reporting that although
the offender was entitled to a “contradictory” hearing to determine his classification, one was never
held); State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 579 (R.I. 2009) (determining that the inability of the registrant
to present evidence did not pose “any actual risk of erroneous deprivation of his protected liberty
interests”).
69. See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 460 (S.D.N.Y 1998) (finding that the offender’s
classification hearing lasted no more than five minutes, and that the court relied on an improper
offense to determine the offender’s classification).
70. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.031(A)(1)–(2) (West 2011) (articulating the new
classifications and their applicability to previously convicted offenders), invalidated by Bodyke,
933 N.E.2d 753.
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authority that the Ohio Supreme Court determined that such legislative
71
action was a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
But it is not just about the expanding number of offenses; it is also
about their broadening scope. Originally, sexual motivation or purpose
was a necessary component for an offense to be registerable, as was
72
evident from the definitional section of the codes and from legislative
73
history. Today, however, registration schemes include mandatory
registration for crimes committed against minors, even where there is no
74
sexual purpose or contact.
Fidelity to the original impetus for sex offender registration would
suggest that, at a minimum, a registration-worthy offense must include
75
underlying sexual predatory behavior or intent. And to some extent,
that initially was the practice. Courts would find a violation of due
process when, on occasion, a state legislature had crossed the bounds to
76
require automatic registration without proof of sexual motivation. For

71. See Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d at 766 (“The reclassification scheme in the AWA works to
‘legislatively vacate[] the settled and final judgments of the judicial branch of government.’ The
legislative attempt to reopen journalized final judgments imposing registration and community
notification requirements on offenders so that new requirements may be imposed suffers the same
constitutional infirmity.” (citations omitted)). Other courts, however, have rejected such claims. See
Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1349 (11th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that Florida’s
reclassification scheme violated the doctrine of separation of powers).
72. See, e.g., State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 8 (Me. 2009) (“[S]ex offender [is defined as] an
individual convicted of gross sexual assault if the victim had not in fact attained 16 years of age at the
time of the crime.” (citing Me. Rev. Stat. tit 34-A, § 11103(5) (1996))); see also People v. Logan, 705
N.E.2d 152, 156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (“The category of sex offenders includes any person who is
convicted of a sex offense or who is certified as a sexually dangerous person pursuant to the Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act . . . .”).
73. See, e.g., Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d at 1345 (observing that the State’s purpose in enacting
Florida’s Sex Offender Act was to protect “the public from sexual abuse”); Lee v. State, 895 So. 2d
1038, 1042 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (“[T]he legislature found that the public was in danger because of
the high recidivism rate among such offenders.”); Logan, 705 N.E.2d at 158–59 (explaining the original
intent of Illinois’ registration law). Sexual purpose was of such fundamental import that, where a plea
agreement resulted in sexual crimes being dismissed and only nonsexual crimes remaining, the court
was required to make a “sexual motivation finding” before requiring registration. See, e.g., State v.
Whalen, 588 S.E.2d 677, 681 (W. Va. 2003).
74. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B)(ii) (2011) (including false imprisonment of a
minor by anyone other than a parent to be a registerable offense); Ind. Code § 11-8-8-5(11), (12)
(2011) (requiring registration for kidnapping and criminal confinement of a minor by anyone other
than a parent or guardian), invalidated by Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009).
75. See, e.g., E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1097 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[W]e found that the legislative
purpose of Megan’s Law was to identify potential recidivists and alert the public when necessary for
the public safety, and to help prevent and promptly resolve incidents involving sexual abuse and
missing persons.”); Fredenburg v. City of Fremont, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 437, 439 (Ct. App. 2004) (“The
Legislature further found that the public had a ‘compelling and necessary . . . interest’ in obtaining
information about released sex offenders so they can ‘adequately protect themselves and their
children from these persons.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 290.03)).
76. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 843 N.E.2d 434, 440 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (“There is no rational
basis for requiring defendant to register as a sex offender where he has no history of committing sex
offenses and his offense of aggravated kidnapping was not sexually motivated and had no sexual
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example, in State v. Robinson, the Florida Supreme Court rejected
automatic registration for the defendant’s kidnapping of a minor, where
77
the defendant stole a vehicle with a sleeping child in the back seat.
Faced with what it perceived to be overreaching by the Florida
legislature, the court stated, “No rational relationship exists between the
statute’s purpose of protecting the public from known sexual predators
78
and Robinson’s designation as one.”
But over the past decade, faithfulness to this rationale has faded.
One observes a perceptible shift as courts defer to legislative attempts to
sweep nonsexual crimes into the purview of registerable offenses. Early
jurisprudence focused on support for legislatures’ intent to use these
79
schemes to protect minors from sexual predators. Courts no longer
appear wedded to that justification. Today, courts regularly uphold
legislation that requires registration for crimes that do not involve sexual
80
contact or that are committed without sexual purpose or intent.
Employing “minor as victim” as a factual predicate for registration
arguably has created a list of registerable offenses far removed from the
original legislative purpose of sex offender registration schemes. Rainer
81
v. State offers an excellent illustration. Deferring to a general legislative
aim of protecting children, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that
the statute’s vague wording demanded that one convicted of robbery of a
82
minor must register as a sex offender. In affirming automatic

purpose.”), rev’d 870 N.E.2d 415 (Ill. 2007); State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205, 1207 (Fla. 2004)
(overturning automatic registration for kidnapping a child); People v. Bell, 778 N.Y.S.2d 837, 847
(App. Div. 2003) (“None of [the defendant’s] actions in kidnapping . . . the child were done for the
purpose of sexual victimization of the child . . . . [Therefore,] to require [defendant] to register as a ‘sex
offender’ is completely arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public morals
or general sexually-charged safety issues.”).
77. 873 So. 2d at 1215.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1276 (2d Cir. 1997) (observing that SORA was
established to improve the ability of law enforcement to combat sex crimes); People v. Malchow,
739 N.E.2d 433, 437 (Ill. 2000) (“[T]he legislature’s intent in requiring registration of sex offenders was
to create an additional measure of protection for children from the increasing incidence of sexual
assault and child abuse.”); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d, 367, 373 (N.J. 1995) (recognizing that the
legislature’s intent in drafting registration laws was to protect women and children from “potential
molestation, rape, or murder”).
80. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 870 N.E.2d 415, 426 (Ill. 2007) (affirming the State’s interest in
automatic registration of offenders who commit crimes against minors despite lack of sexual
motivation); State v. Smith, 780 N.W.2d 90, 105–06 (Wis. 2010) (determining that automatic
registration did not violate equal protection or due process when applied to a defendant who was
convicted of false imprisonment of a minor that involved no sexual misconduct). For an argument that
the inclusion of nonsexual offenses in registration schemes violates due process, see Ofer Raban, Be
They Fish or Not Fish: The Fishy Registration of Nonsexual Offenders, 16 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 497
(2007).
81. 690 S.E.2d 827 (Ga. 2010).
82. Id. at 829–30 (concluding that robbery of a minor qualifies as a registerable offense under
Georgia’s registration law).
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registration, the court dismissed as irrelevant the fact that defendant’s
83
robbery did not involve sexual activity. The majority reasoned that
requiring defendant to register as a sex offender served to “protect[]
84
children from those who would harm them.” But dissenting Chief
Justice Hunstein was concerned by the overinclusiveness of such a
pronouncement, stating that including crimes of this nature “serves
merely to sweep within its purview those, such as [the appellant], who
85
should not be characterized as ‘sexual offenders.’”
Two forces are at play when courts uphold automatic registration of
offenders who did not commit sexually motivated crimes. First is the
86
apparent commitment to defer to legislative intent and prerogative, and
second is a clear disinclination to employ an as-applied analysis to due
87
process claims. Both forces appeared to be operating in State v. Smith,
when the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the duty of seventeenyear-old James Smith to register for falsely imprisoning another
88
seventeen-year-old boy to collect a drug debt. Despite clear proof that
defendant was not sexually motivated to commit the crime, the majority
determined that these facts were not of particular sway since “the
legislature may well have rationally concluded that child abductions are
89
often precursors to sexual offenses.” Similarly, in People v. Johnson the
Supreme Court of Illinois upheld automatic registration in the case of a
man who kidnapped his granddaughter for financial gain rather than
sexual motivation, concluding that a generalized belief that kidnapping
of a minor could lead to sexual abuse of the minor was sufficient to meet
90
due process.

83. Id. at 829 (“[T]he fact that Rainer’s [robbery] did not involve sexual activity is of no
consequence.”).
84. Id. But see State v. Chun, 76 P.3d 935, 941 (Haw. 2003) (rejecting the government’s argument
that registration is required “even if the elements of the charged offense do not entail ‘sexual
conduct’”).
85. Rainer, 690 S.E.2d at 831 (Hunstein, P.J., dissenting). Although Presiding Justice Hunstein did
not sway the majority in Rainer, she did prevail on a different law affecting offenders when she
authored an opinion finding that Georgia’s residency restrictions violated principles of eminent
domain for forcing a long-standing resident to move. See Mann v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740,
742 (Ga. 2007).
86. See Rainer, 690 S.E.2d at 829 (“It is rational to conclude that requiring those who falsely
imprison minors who are not the child’s parent to register . . . advances the State’s legitimate goal of
informing the public for purposes of protecting children from those who would harm them.”).
87. See State v. Smith, 780 N.W.2d 90, 109–10 (Wis. 2010) (Bradley, J. dissenting) (criticizing the
majority’s refusal to consider appellant’s as-applied challenge to the requirement to register as a sex
offender for commission of false imprisonment of a minor).
88. Id. at 92–93 (majority opinion).
89. Id. at 102.
90. 870 N.E.2d 415, 426 (Ill. 2007) (“Our General Assembly . . . recognized that aggravated
kidnapping can be a precursor to sex offenses against children.”).
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B. Increased Registration Burdens
Registration requirements are not inconsequential. As the Supreme
Court observed in Lawrence v. Texas, even a conviction of a misdemeanor
91
sexual offense imposes a stigma that “is not trivial.” Indeed, courts
acknowledge that registration involves significant and intrusive burdens
92
that brand the offender. Concomitant to the increasing number and
nature of registration-worthy offenses, registration schemes also have
expanded the burdens of registration—both in duration and in the
93
detailed nature of the personal information required. And in many
states, the increased burdens are unrelated to the risk level of the
94
offender.
1. Duration
Under the first generation of sex offender registration laws, states
employed a variety of classification systems to determine the offender’s
95
attendant registration burdens. Generally, offenders were required to
register according to their level of dangerousness; the minimum usually
96
97
was ten years and the maximum was lifetime registration. Under
SORNA, offenders are categorized by their convictions and are
98
automatically assigned to a tier based on that offense. Tier I offenses
are regarded as the least serious crimes, with each succeeding tier
99
consisting of more dangerous offenses. Today, a tier I offender
100
generally must register for a minimum of fifteen years or, often, twenty
101
years. Additionally, many more crimes today have been assigned
102
103
lifetime registration or recast to require lifetime registration.

91. 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
92. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205, 1213 (Fla. 2004) (recognizing that Florida’s
statute “imposes more than a stigma,” subjecting designated sexual predators to “life-long registration
requirements”); State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1041 (Kan. 1996) (“The practical effect of such
unrestricted dissemination could make it impossible for the offender to find housing or
employment.”).
93. See infra notes 95–117 and accompanying text.
94. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
95. See Carpenter, supra note 34, at 328–31.
96. See, e.g., Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 375 (Ind. 2009) (citing Ind. Code § 5-2-12-13 (1995)
(requiring a ten-year minimum registration period)); Smith v. State, 2009-1765U, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir.
3/26/10) (noting the ten-year minimum registration requirement in effect at the time of the defendant’s
conviction in 1995).
97. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 11-707(a)(4)(iii) (LexisNexis 2011) (detailing
registration for life for tier III sex offenders); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-460 (2011) (requiring registration
“biannually for life” for certain offenses).
98. See 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2010).
99. Id. (defining the offenses that make up tiers II and III, and stating that “[t]he term ‘tier I sex
offender’ means a sex offender other than a tier II or tier III sex offender”).
100. Pollis v. State, 2009-Ohio-5058U, ¶ 58 (Ct. App.) (discussing the change in the registration
requirement from ten years to fifteen years).
101. See, e.g., N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-h(1) (2011) (requiring level one offenders to register
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2. Additional Personal Information
All registration schemes require offenders to provide detailed
personal information. The first incarnation of registration following the
federal guidelines required that each registrant provide local law
104
enforcement with their name, address, photograph, and fingerprints; in
105
some states, the offender must also supply a biological specimen.
Today, sex offenders may also be asked to supply driver’s license
numbers, dates and places of birth, dates and places of conviction, places
of employment, passwords to social networking websites, and prior
106
107
crimes. Some states also require offenders to provide DNA samples.
The changes made to Louisiana’s registration scheme exemplify the
nationwide trend towards more demanding requirements. In 2001,
Louisiana’s sex offender statute required a registrant to provide a few
key pieces of information. An offender would be asked to register “his

annually for twenty years); see also Buck v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 661, 663 (Ky. 2010)
(observing that the 2006 amendments to the Kentucky registration scheme increased registration for
nonlifetime offenses from ten years to twenty years).
102. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 290 (2011) (mandating lifetime registration for sodomy; lewd and
lascivious acts with a minor; oral copulation; forcible acts of sexual penetration; kidnapping;
kidnapping for ransom, reward, or extortion, or to commit robbery or rape; harmful matter sent with
intent of seduction of minor; lewd or obscene conduct; indecent exposure; and obscene exhibitions).
103. See, e.g., Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384, 394 (Ind. 2009) (upholding the change from ten-year
to lifetime registration); see also State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 9–10 (Me. 2009) (discussing the change
in registration from fifteen-year to lifetime registration following the amendment of Maine’s
SORNA); McCabe v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Va. 2007) (reporting the change from tenyear to lifetime registration); Smith v. State, 2009-1765U, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/26/10) (same).
104. See Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration
Act (“SORA”), Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101(b)(1)(A)(ii), (iv), 108 Stat. 2038, 2040 (1996) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006)) (repealed 2006); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-258(a)(1) (2011)
(stating that information in the registration is a matter of public record and is available for access
during normal business hours at the local police department); Fla. Stat. § 943.043(3) (2011)
(explaining that a member of the public can obtain information, including a photograph of the
offender and a summary of convictions, through a toll-free number); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 846E-3(b)
(West 2011) (allowing information, such as address, car information, and a picture to be released by
the county police department); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 11-717 (LexisNexis 2011) (indicating
that all registrants’ information shall be available to the public either through the Internet or by
request); Miss. Code Ann. § 45-33-49(3), (4) (2011) (ordering that “any information deemed
necessary for the protection of the public,” such as a photograph, place of employment, and crime for
which the offender was convicted, shall be provided to anyone who requests the information of any
registrant); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651-B:7(IV) (2011) (declaring that any member of the public may
request information from the local law enforcement agency regarding the list of registrants including
their pictures and addresses).
105. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 943.325 (2011); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4907(b) (2011); Miss. Code
Ann. § 45-33-37 (2011); Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 584 (2011).
106. See, e.g., N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-b(1)(a)-(c) (2011) (requiring a sex offender to provide his
name, alias, date of birth, sex, race, height, weight, eye color, driver's license number, home address,
description of the offense, date of conviction, sentence imposed, photograph, and fingerprints); Utah
Code Ann. § 77-27-21.5 (2011); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.130 (2011).
107. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 36-18-25 (2011); Cal. Penal Code § 296.2(c) (2011); La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 15:542(C)(1) (2011).
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name, address, and place of employment; the crime for which he was
convicted; the date and place of such conviction; any aliases used by the
108
person; and the person’s social security number.” Today, Louisiana’s
Megan’s Law includes one of the most detailed and extensive lists of
required information, including palm prints, a DNA sample, and all
109
landline and mobile telephone numbers. Additionally, the risk level of
the offender is not relevant to the level of detail required: sex offenders
and child predators alike are asked to provide the same information
110
under Louisiana’s Megan’s Law.
Because computers are now an integral part of daily life, many sex
offender statutes have been amended to restrict or remove freedoms and
activities associated with computer usage. Many states require offenders
to notify local law enforcement of all email and social network
usernames and passwords, plus any changes to those usernames or
111
passwords. As of 2009, Alaska requires all registrants, regardless of
conviction date or risk level, to disclose their email addresses, instant
messaging address, and other Internet communication identifiers when
112
registering as a sex offender. Indiana requires an offender to disclose
any email address, instant message username, electronic chat room
username, or social networking website username that the sex offender
113
uses or intends to use. And, also as of 2009, members of the Alaskan
public can submit an email address, instant message address, or other
Internet identifier to the Department of Public Safety and receive a
confirmation of whether that address or identifier has been registered by
114
a sex offender or child kidnapper.
But that is not all. In Indiana, for example, an offender who
registers electronic or social networking information must also consent to
searches of personal computers, or any device with Internet capacity, at
115
any time. The offender must also agree to the installation of hardware

108. State ex rel. Olivieri v. State, 779 So. 2d 735, 739 (La. 2001) (quoting La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 15:542(B)).
109. The statute requires sex offenders and child predators alike to provide local law enforcement
with detailed information including: the name and aliases used by the offender; physical description of
the offender; addresses, including temporary housing, employment, and school; a current photograph;
fingerprints, palm prints and a DNA sample; a description of every vehicle registered to or operated
by the offender, including license plate number; a copy of the offender’s driver’s license; and every
email address, online screen name, or other online identifiers used by the offender to communicate on
the Internet. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:542(C)(1) (2011).
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-21.5(14) (2011).
112. Alaska Stat. Ann. § 12.63.010(b)(1)(I) (West 2010).
113. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-8(a)(7) (2011), invalidated by Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009);
see N.Y. Correct. Law § 168b-10 (2011).
114. Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1001 n.13 (Alaska 2008).
115. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-8(b). For discussion of the impact of this law on the Fourth Amendment,
see Doe v. Indiana, 566 F. Supp. 2d 862, 879 (D. Ind. 2008) (finding the search was unconstitutional
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116

that would monitor Internet usage. Such consent is required no matter
the level of risk the offender poses, or even whether the conviction
117
resulted from illegal online activity.

C. Expanding Notification Requirements
Fundamentally, notification laws were appended to registration laws
to provide communities with appropriate and necessary information
118
about sex offenders residing in their communities. When community
notification schemes were first introduced, they were tailored to funnel
information from law enforcement agencies and other designated entities
119
to the communities in a narrow and controlled manner. In upholding
the constitutionality of the first generation of notification laws, courts
emphasized two foundational aspects. First, courts found that the
information was no greater than that discerned from the public record of
120
a conviction, and second, that the amount of personal information
121
disseminated was specifically tied to the risk level of the offender.

because registrants who are not on supervised release “are entitled to full Fourth Amendment
protection, without the lowered expectation of privacy”).
116. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-8(b).
117. Id. § 11-8-8-8.
118. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93 (2003) (“The legislature further determined that
‘release of certain information about sex offenders to public agencies and the general public will assist
in protecting the public safety.’” (quoting 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 41, § 1)); Community Protection
Act, § 401, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 49 (“The legislature finds that . . . law enforcement’s efforts to
protect their communities . . . are impaired by the lack of information available to law enforcement
agencies about convicted sex offenders who live within the law enforcement agency’s jurisdiction.”).
119. See, e.g., State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 585 (Ohio 1998) (upholding the state’s registration
statute as “narrowly tailored to disseminate information only to those persons necessary in order to
protect the public,” namely, law enforcement, neighbors, and certain school officials); see also State v.
Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1028 (Kan. 1996) (Abramson, J., dissenting) (observing that, at the time, the
majority of jurisdictions kept the information confidential and that only a few registration schemes
“show[ed] a trend toward limited public disclosure”).
120. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 98 (“[T]he stigma of Alaska’s Megan’s Law results not
from public display for ridicule and shaming but from the dissemination of accurate information about
a criminal record, most of which is already public.”); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1099 (3d Cir.
1997) (“The ‘sting’ of Megan's Law for tier 2 and 3 registrants results not from their being publicly
displayed for ridicule and shaming but rather from the dissemination of accurate public record
information about their past criminal activities and a risk assessment by responsible public agencies
based on that information.”); State v. Haskell, 784 A.2d 4, 11 (Me. 2001) (“The ‘[d]issemination of
[accurate information about past criminal activity] in and of itself has never been regarded as
punishment . . . .’” (quoting E.B., 119 F.3d at 1099–1100 (alternation in original))).
121. See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1278 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[New York’s notification statute
was] carefully calibrated to, and depends solely upon, the offender’s perceived risk of reoffense . . . .”); State ex rel. Olivieri v. State, 779 So. 2d 735, 739 n.9 (La. 2001) (“[Louisiana’s sex
offender statute] originally only provided that [c]riminal justice agencies are authorized to release
relevant and necessary information regarding sex offenders to the public when release of the
information is necessary for public protection . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cook, 700
N.E.2d at 574–75 (comparing the information disseminated for “sexual predators” versus “sexually
oriented offenders”).
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Thus, if there was little likelihood of reoffense, fewer community
members received a smaller amount of personal information.
Today, however, these controlling principles have been replaced by
a new paradigm: Residents of any community are entitled to great
amounts of information about all sex offenders, without regard to their
122
The release of this information affects
likelihood of reoffense.
registrants’ lives in ways far more consequential than the lingering effect
that public knowledge of a conviction may generate. And it is not just
because of the amount of information—it is also because of the subtext
of the message. In Knowledge as Power, Wayne Logan argues that the
123
context in which the information is conveyed is “far from neutral.” The
release of sex offenders’ information contains an implicit message of
dangerousness because states have intentionally singled out sex offenders
from other offenders for this specific treatment, thus “contradict[ing]
124
governmental neutrality.”
1. The Nature of the Information Released
Because many modern notification schemes do not distinguish
125
among offenders, they provide the public with a significant amount of
126
including detailed physical
information about all offenders,
127
descriptions of the registrants, their home and work addresses, “and
128
links to maps of their locations.” Upheld by the Supreme Court in
Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, online registries are not
required to distinguish between those individuals who pose a high risk to
129
society and those who pose a low risk. Additionally, because online

122. See, e.g., Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009) (“[Indiana’s registration scheme]
makes information on all sex offenders available to the general public without restriction and without
regard to whether the individual poses any particular future risk.”).
123. Logan, supra note 51, at 138.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. Ann. § 18.65.087(b) (West 2010); Fla. Stat. § 943.44353(1) (2011)
(providing for automatic public notification of registration information for sex offenders and sexual
predators alike); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 846E-3 (West 2011); Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-21.5 (2011); Wis.
Stat. § 301.46(5)(4)(bm) (2011). But see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, § 178(D) (2011) (prohibiting
publication of level one and level two offenders’ registration information on Massachusetts’s sex
offender Internet database).
126. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15.542.1(A) (2011) (requiring any convicted sex offender to “give
notice of the crime for which he was convicted, his name, residential address, a description of his
physical characteristics . . . and a photograph” by mail to one person in every residence or business
within a one-mile or three-tenths of a mile radius of where the offender will reside and to the
superintendent of the school district in which the offender will reside).
127. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1001 (Alaska 2008) (“A photograph of each registrant
appears on a webpage under the caption ‘Registered Sex Offender/Child Kidnapper.’ Each registrant’s
page also displays the registrant’s physical description, home address, employer, work address, and
conviction information.”).
128. Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 376 (Ind. 2009).
129. 538 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2003); see, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:542.1(A) (articulating the same
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registries generally use the same font size and coloring when labeling all
registrants, the posts create an air of perceived danger around all
130
offenders.
Not only are comprehensive posts the order of the day, the posts are
made available to an extensive list of persons. In New York, for example,
a low-risk offender’s information may be provided to “any entity with
vulnerable populations related to the nature of the offense committed by
131
such sex offender.” “Vulnerable population” is not defined in New
York’s sex offender statute, so it is within the discretion of the law
enforcement agency to determine what entities will receive “relevant
132
information.” Plus, “[a]ny entity receiving information on a sex
offender may disclose or further disseminate such information at its
133
discretion.”
In a critique of Connecticut’s online registry that included all
offenders regardless of their risk, the Second Circuit called it an
“instrument . . . too blunt” to “protect the health and welfare of the
134
State’s children.” The fallout from such widespread posting should not
be minimized. The Third Circuit recognized that “[p]eople interact with
135
others based on the information they have about them.” For sex
offenders whose information is publicly available on the Internet, the
136
fear of retributive violence or harassment “[is] not short lived.”
Some notification laws appear to provide limitations on the
information released. But the presence of these terms is misleading.
Under Washington’s Community Protection Act of 1990, for example,
the release of information is dependent on an agency determination that
the “information is relevant and necessary to protect the public and
137
counteract the danger created by the particular offender.” While the
terms “necessary and relevant” seem to restrict dissemination, in
practice, public agencies in Washington may exercise their discretion in
138
deciding when to notify the public and whom to notify. No hard limits

notification procedures for all sex offenders); Bertram v. State, 2009-Ohio-5210U, ¶ 42 (Ct. App.)
(“[E]very offender must provide identical information, and the information is published in the same
manner for every offender.”).
130. For example, each entry in Alaska’s registry includes the heading “sex offender/child
kidnapper” in large blue lettering, but identifies the specific offense in small, black font at the bottom
of the page. Sex Offender/Child Kidnapper Registration Central Registry, Alaska Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, http://www.dps.alaska.gov/sorweb/aspx/sorcra1.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2012).
131. N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-l(6)(a) (2011).
132. Id. § 168-l.
133. Id. § 168-l(6)(a) (emphasis added).
134. Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 2001), rev’d sub nom. Conn.
Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
135. E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1102 (3d Cir. 1997).
136. Id.
137. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.550(1) (2011).
138. Id.; see N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-l(6)(a) (2011).
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are placed on Washington’s public agencies in interpreting the state’s
139
notification provisions.
2. Access to the Information
When community notification statutes were first introduced, there
was concern that a registrant’s privacy interest was severely
140
compromised by the disclosure of detailed personal information. While
this argument holds merit, courts nevertheless declared community
notification statutes constitutional because, on balance, the collected
data were disseminated in a controlled manner and contained no more
information than what is otherwise disseminated by the fact of
141
conviction. In State v. Cook, the Ohio Supreme Court found the state’s
notification provision to be an “objectively reasonable measure to warn
142
with disclosure
those . . . most likely to be potential victims,”
specifically aimed at “those most likely to have contact with the
143
offender.” But, almost ten years later, the Ohio Supreme Court dealt
144
with a “significantly modified” statute in Bertram v. State. When
Bertram came before the court, Ohio’s sex offender statute required that
an “offender’s information . . . be open to public inspection
and . . . included in the internet sex offender and child-victim offender
145
database.”
Current notification laws provide the public with unfettered access
to considerable personal information that would otherwise be “far less
146
accessible” to them. A few short years ago, by comparison, hard copies
139. Doe v. Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. 1478, 1481 (W.D. Wash. 1997) (“On the face of the statute, all
information provided by the registrant (including his address and place of employment) could be
publicized. No notice or hearing is required, and no guidelines are provided to the local agencies.”).
For judicial interpretation of Washington’s “necessary and relevant” language, see State v. Ward, 869
P.2d 1062, 1071 (Wash. 1994) (upholding the language in the belief that it ensures that notification will
“fit the threat posed to public safety”).
140. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 411 (N.J. 1995) (acknowledging that notification laws link
some information together that otherwise would not be readily discernible); see also Brief for the
Comm. for Pub. Counsel Servs. & the ACLU of Mass. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Doe v.
Att’y Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007 (Mass. 1997) (No. SJC-07481), 1997 WL 33832824, at *29 (contending
that registrants suffer invasion of privacy because the public is able to retrieve data from a “readily
accessible location”).
141. See, e.g., Poritz, 662 A.2d at 404 (“[T]he notification provisions are as carefully tailored as one
could expect in order to perform their remedial function without excessively intruding on the
anonymity of the offender.”); see also State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1036–37 (Kan. 1996) (finding a
notification statute nonpunitive because of its provisions for only limited disclosure).
142. 700 N.E.2d 570, 581 (Ohio 1998).
143. Id. at 585; see Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1090 (9th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d
1263, 1269 (2d Cir. 1997).
144. 2009-Ohio-5210U, ¶ 32 (Ct. App.).
145. Id. ¶ 20.
146. See State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 23 (Me. 2009); Bertram, 2009-Ohio-5210U, ¶ 32 (“Besides
the change in the classification system, the increase in the duration and frequency of the requirements
for registration, and the increase in the information provided, the access of the public to the
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of registries were maintained by local law enforcement and available to
147
the public “during normal business hours.” The introduction of the
Internet has made “the geographic reach of this information
148
boundless.” An offender’s information is globally disseminated through
online state-maintained registries, and individuals from any part of the
world—whether they may ever be contemplated future victims or even
have contact with the offender—can access a state’s online registry and
the accumulated personal information on it.
The evolution of Utah’s notification laws offers one example. The
state’s original notification scheme restricted dissemination of an
offender’s registration information to individuals who were the victim of
a sex offense or who lived within the offender’s zip code or an adjoining
149
Prompted by “a backlog of information requests,” Utah’s
one.
legislature eliminated this geographical restriction on the dissemination
150
of registration information in 1998. Because the amended statute did
not place any restrictions on the dissemination of information, Utah’s
Department of Identification, the agency responsible for maintaining the
151
state’s central registry, created an online registry. Today, anyone with
access to the Internet can access Utah’s sex offender registry, “regardless
152
of [the person’s] place of residence or any other specific need.”
But it is not just the Internet where information is posted. Today,
dissemination of public information comes in many forms. One modern
notification law also contemplates dissemination by “any other notice
deemed appropriate by the court . . . including but not limited to signs,
153
handbills, bumper stickers, or clothing labeled to that effect.”

information has been greatly increased through the use of an internet database . . . .”).
147. Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2001), rev’d sub nom. Conn.
Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 584 U.S. 1 (2003).
148. Doe v. Dist. Att’y, 932 A.2d 552, 568 (Me. 2007) (Alexander & Silver, JJ., concurring).
149. Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1247 (10th Cir. 2000); see Doe v. Dist. Att’y, 932 A.2d at
557 (noting that Maine’s Bureau of Identification is now required to post on the Internet much of the
same information that previously could be retrieved by the public only through written request).
150. Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1247.
151. Id. at 1247–48; see Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 91 (2003) (“The Act does not specify the means
by which the registry information must be made public. Alaska has chosen to make most of the
nonconfidential information available on the Internet.”).
152. Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1248; see Doe v. Lee, 132 F. Supp. 2d 57, 69 (D. Conn. 2001) (“[T]he
website makes information available to millions of people who will never come to the state or
otherwise come into contact with a registrant.”), aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee,
271 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2001), rev’d sub nom. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 584 U.S. 1 (2003).
153. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:542.1(A)(3) (2011). Dissemination comes in all forms. See, e.g.,
Michael Dear & Django Sibley, The One-Way Strategy for Sex Offenders Makes Nobody Safe, L.A.
Times, Oct. 1, 2000, at M6 (“Police handed out fliers and notified local media about Linares’ crimes,
physical description, address and the license-plate number of a car registered to his family.”); Todd S.
Purdum, Death of Sex Offender Is Tied to Megan’s Law, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1998, at A16 (discussing
the suicide of a registered “high risk” sex offender who “was one of 6 such offenders singled out by the
Santa Rosa Police Department . . . in its first effort at public notification”).
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3. Removal from Registries
Although significant energy and resources have been expended to
create broad-based notification systems, states have devoted insufficient
thought to developing mechanisms to remove offenders from the
registries. In some states, no mechanism exists for removal of a
154
registrant’s information from the government’s online registry, possibly
155
due in part to the recognition of how difficult such a task might be.
And even where procedures are in place for removal, a jurisdiction may
be vested with discretion to continue to provide information to law
enforcement, regardless of whether the person is still required to
156
register.
Even where removal is contemplated, the use of the Internet to
disseminate information creates significant challenges in attempting to
remove an offender’s information from an online registry. Unlike a
generation ago, where a damning flyer or notice could be removed from
a storefront wall, registration information on the Internet is forever
157
“etched in cyberspace.”
Ricky Blackmun’s story is not atypical. Ricky was sixteen when he
158
had sexual intercourse with his thirteen-year-old girlfriend. The offense
159
occurred in Iowa, where Ricky’s record was eventually expunged. But
Ricky’s family had moved to Oklahoma to get a fresh start after Ricky’s
160
conviction. In Oklahoma, Ricky was required to register as a tier III
sex offender, a classification that entailed having his driver’s license
stamped with the words “sex offender” just below his picture in red
161
letters. It was not until four years later that Ricky’s name was removed
from the registry when Oklahoma’s legislature passed a law that
expunged offenders’ records in Oklahoma of certain offenses committed
162
in other jurisdictions. Although Ricky’s name was removed from the

154. See, e.g., Col. Rev. Stat. § 16-22-111 (2011); Fla. Stat. §§ 943.0435(11)(a)(3), 943.04354
(2011); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 34-A, §§ 11221, 11225-A (2011); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.101
(2009). But see Wis. Stat. § 301.46(6)(a) (2011) (allowing dissemination of information only for the
period during which an offender is required to register).
155. Doe v. Dist. Att’y, 932 A.2d 552, 562 (Me. 2007) (“[R]emoval may be both technically and
practically difficult in light of websites . . . which take ‘snapshots’ of web pages and archive them for
posterity.”); see Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1286 (2d Cir. 1997) (addressing briefly the difficulty of
removing offenders’ information post registration).
156. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 301.46(6)(b) (providing that law enforcement agencies may be
permitted access to an offender’s registration information “for law enforcement purposes” even after
registration period terminates).
157. Doe v. Dist. Att’y, 932 A.2d at 568 n.21 (Alexander & Silver, JJ., concurring).
158. Grinberg, supra note 44.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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163

state’s sex offender registry, the impact of the “sex offender” label
continues to haunt him. In one interview, Ricky discussed the fear he
feels wherever he goes, a result of the lingering concerns he believes that
164
others may have about him.

D. The New Generation of Residency Restrictions
Residency restrictions serve as an accurate barometer for the
165
increasing harshness of sex offender registration schemes. Generally
166
upheld as civil nonpunitive measures, residency restrictions prohibit
convicted sex offenders from residing near designated locations “where
minors congregate,” such as schools, day-care centers, and recreational
167
parks and playgrounds. Where enacted, they are intended to apply to
168
all registrants, including those whose convictions occurred prior to the
169
enactment of the particular residency restriction, those whose crimes

163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 706 (8th Cir. 2005) (“In smaller towns, a single school or
child care facility can cause all of the incorporated areas of the town to be off limits to sex offenders
[due to residency restrictions].”); In re E.J., 223 P.3d 31, 38–40 (Cal. 2010) (reviewing the stricter
provisions embodied in Jessica’s Law).
166. See, e.g., Miller, 405 F.3d at 704–05 (finding that residency restrictions do not violate
constitutional principles); Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 766 n.8 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that
the city’s decision to ban the offender from parks “was not ‘punishing’ him at all,” but was a civil
measure designed to protect the public); Coston v. Petro, 398 F. Supp. 2d 878, 887 (S.D. Ohio 2005)
(determining that residency restrictions are not punitive in nature).
167. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 42-1-15 (2011) (prohibiting sex offenders from living within 1000
feet of a school, day-care center, or area where minors congregate); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/11-9.3(b)
(2009) (barring sex offenders from loitering within 500 feet of a playground, child-care centers, or
facilities that offer programs for children); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17.545 (West 2007) (barring sex
offenders from residing within 1000 feet of any preschool, primary or secondary school public
playground or licensed child day-care facility); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.034 (West 2011)
(restricting sex offenders from residing within 1000 feet of any school, preschool, or child day-care
center), invalidated by State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 2011) (ruling that sections of the
state’s sex offender laws unconstitutionally increase the punishment for crimes committed before the
law took effect); Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-21.7 (2011) (prohibiting sex offenders from being in the
area, on foot or in or on any motorized or nonmotorized vehicle, of any day-care facility, public park,
or primary or secondary school).
168. See, e.g., Miller, 405 F.3d at 721 (“[Iowa’s residency restrictions] appl[y] ‘regardless of whether
a particular offender is a danger to the public.’” (quoting Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 871 (S.D.
Iowa 2004))); State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 1153 (Ind. 2009) (“The statute does not consider the
seriousness of the crime, the relationship between the victim and the offender, or an initial
determination of the risk of re-offending.”); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 441 (Ky. 2009)
(“While the original residency restriction statute applied only to those on probation, parole, or other
form of supervised release, the current statute applies to all registrants regardless of probation or
parole status.”).
169. See, e.g., Miller, 405 F.3d at 723 (affirming Iowa’s residency restrictions); In re E.J., 223 P.3d at
34. Recently, however, courts have begun to question the constitutionality of such restrictions. See,
e.g., Pollard, 908 N.E.2d at 1154 (finding that Indiana’s residency restrictions violated the prohibition
on ex post facto laws because it imposes a burden that has the effect of adding punishment beyond
that which could have been imposed at the time of sentencing); Baker, 295 S.W.3d at 447 (determining
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170

were committed against adult victims, and those whose crimes were of
171
a nonsexual nature.
When first introduced, restrictions often contemplated a buffer zone
172
of 1000 feet or less. By today’s standards, that would be considered
minimal. Current legislative enactments boast buffer zones of up to 2500
173
feet. In addition to enlarging the zones, legislatures have broadened the
174
concept of “where children congregate” to include bus stops, video
175
176
arcade centers, and libraries. Moreover, it is often the offender who
has to keep track of whether a day-care center or video arcade moves to
within 1000 feet of his home. Thus, the burden is placed on the offender
177
to determine compliance. Compounding that burden, most residency
restrictions do not include any type of “move-to-the-offender exception,”
which would exempt the offender from leaving an already established
178
residence when the prohibited sites moves into the neighborhood. As
expanding residency restrictions play out against the community
landscape, one thing is clear: Larger buffer zones with more points of

that residency restrictions violate ex post facto principles when applied to previously convicted
offenders); Berlin v. Evans, 923 N.Y.S.2d 828, 834–35 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (same).
170. See, e.g., Pollard, 908 N.E.2d at 1153 (“Although denominated as applying only to ‘offender[s]
against children,’ the residency restriction statute is actually much broader.”); Baker, 295 S.W.3d at
444 (“Even those registrants whose victims were adults are prohibited from living near an area where
children gather.”).
171. For a detailed look at the various components of sex offender registration laws, see Brian J.
Love, Regulating for Safety or Punishing Depravity? A Pathfinder for Sex Offender Residency
Restriction Statutes, 43 Crim. L. Bull. 834, 839–53 (2007).
172. See Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws,
92 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (2006) (noting that the average residency restriction zone in 2006 was 1000 feet).
173. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 15-20A-11(a) (2011) (enlarging the state’s residency restriction zone
from 1000 feet to 2000 feet); Cal. Penal Code § 3003.5 (2011) (increasing the state’s residency
restriction zone to 2000 feet under Jessica’s Law); Okla. St. Ann. tit. 57 § 590A (West 2011) (2000
feet); see also Damien Cave, Roadside Camp for Miami Sex Offenders Leads to Lawsuit, N.Y. Times,
July 10, 2009, at A14 (reporting on the growing number of sex offenders forced to camp out on
Miami’s Julia Tuttle Causeway because of a residency restriction barring registrants from living within
2500 feet of where children gather).
174. See H. 4323, 116th Sess. (S.C. 2006) (prohibiting certain sex offenders from residing within
1000 feet of bus stops).
175. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:91.1a(2) (2011) (adding freestanding video arcades to the list of
locations).
176. See H.R. 7621, Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2006) (barring child predators from residing within 500 feet of
day-care facilities, schools, public parks, playgrounds, libraries).
177. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 42-1-15 (2011); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17.545 (West 2007),
invalidated by Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437 (Ky. 2009); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.034
(West 2011), invalidated by State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 2011). But see Ala. Code § 1520A-11(c) (2011) (“Changes to property within 2000 feet of an adult criminal sex offender's registered
address which occur after an adult criminal sex offender establishes residency or accepts employment
shall not form the basis for finding that a criminal sex offender is in violation of [residency restrictions].”).
178. Mann v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 742 (Ga. 2007) (“Under the terms of [Georgia’s
sex offender] statute, it is apparent that there is no place in Georgia where a registered sex offender
can live without being continually at risk of being ejected. [It] contains no move-to-offender exception
to its provisions.”).
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reference effectively freeze out most sex offenders from the vast majority
179
of communities in the United States.

E. Introduction of GPS Monitoring Systems
Global Positioning Satellite (“GPS”) monitoring is a relatively
recent addition to registration schemes. In 2005, Florida’s state
legislature passed Jessica’s Law, which provided for the use of GPS or
other electronic devices to track certain sex offenders after release from
180
confinement. Subsequently, in 2006, as part of the Adam Walsh Act,
the federal government offered grant programs and technical assistance
181
to states in order to implement similar electronic monitoring programs.
Inspired by Florida’s legislation and spurred on by the federal
incentives in the AWA, as many as thirty-nine states have amended their
sex offender statutes to permit some form of electronic monitoring of
182
convicted sex offenders. A number of monitoring programs are
imposed on sex offenders as a condition of, and for the duration of,
183
parole or supervised release. However, several states impose electronic

179. Jurists, scholars, and journalists alike have recognized the magnitude of the impact that
residency restrictions have on offenders. See, e.g., Mann, 653 S.E.2d at 744 (“[Georgia’s residency
restrictions do] not merely interfere with, it positively precludes [a registrant] from having any
reasonable investment-backed expectation in any property purchases as his private residence.”);
Berlin v. Evans, 923 N.Y.S.2d 828, 835 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (acknowledging that the registrant, a tier I
offender, was effectively banished from living in Manhattan). For articles criticizing residency
restrictions, see Amanda Moghaddam, Popular Politics and Unintended Consequences: The Punitive
Effect of Sex Offender Residency Restriction Statutes from an Empirical Perspective, 40 S.W. L. Rev.
223 (2010); Richard Tewksbury, Exile at Home: The Unintended Collateral Consequences of Sex
Offender Residency Restrictions, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. Rev. 531 (2007); Monica Davey, Iowa’s Residency
Rules Drive Sex Offenders Underground, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 2006, at A1 (reporting on the
consequences of Iowa’s residency restrictions and calling into question the restrictions’ effectiveness);
Carol DeMare, Efforts to Protect Kids Often Carry Own Risks, Albany Union Times, Sept. 9, 2007, at
A1 (describing the travails of one offender who moved and was unable, because of residency
restrictions, to find housing of any kind); Skipp & Campo-Flores, supra note 49 (reporting on
displaced persons around the country).
180. State Statutes Related to Jessica’s Law, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures Criminal
Justice Program, http://www.leg.state.vt.us/WorkGroups/sexoffenders/NCSLs_Jessicas_Law_Summary.pdf
(last visited Mar. 17, 2012) [hereinafter State Statutes Related to Jessica’s Law].
181. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 621, 120 Stat. 587,
633–34 (2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 16981 (2010)) (authorizing the Attorney General to
award grants to states and local governments to carry out programs to outfit sex offenders with
electronic monitoring units).
182. State Statutes Related to Jessica’s Law, supra note 180, at 1; see, e.g., Ala. Code § 15-20A-20
(2011); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-902(G) (2011); Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-923 (2011); Cal. Penal
Code § 3004 (2011); Fla. Stat. § 947.1405(7) (2011); Ga. Code Ann. § 42-1-14 (2011); Ind. Code § 1113-3-4(j) (2011); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:560.4 (2011); Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.285 (2011); Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 217.735 (2011); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-10.1(E) (West 2011); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.40B
(2011); Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 510.10 (2011); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-540 (2011); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 9.94A.704(5) (2011).
183. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-902(G); Fla. Stat. § 947.1405; Ind. Code § 11-13-3-4(j);
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 47 (2011); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-540(A); Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.704(5).
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monitoring on statutorily specified offenders for the duration of the
184
offenders’ natural life. And in most cases, individuals subject to
electronic monitoring are also required to reimburse the state for the
185
cost of the monitoring program.
Similar to other registration burdens, electronic monitoring
provisions are “drawn on broad categorical grounds” that do not allow
for individualized determination of dangerousness or likelihood of
186
recidivism. In Massachusetts, for example, legislation demands that any
person who is placed on probation following conviction for certain
187
proscribed sex offenses must wear a GPS device at all times. Prior to
this enactment, a sentencing judge could exercise discretion in imposing
188
GPS monitoring as a condition of probation. Today, the sanction
“applies without exception to convicted sex offenders sentenced to a
probationary term, regardless of any individualized determination of
189
their dangerousness or risk of reoffense.”
The introduction of GPS monitoring programs has not affected the
offender’s obligation to comply with registration burdens. An offender
who is required to register may also be required to wear an electronic or
190
GPS monitoring device for the duration of registration. Because of the
recent emergence of GPS monitoring, case law is still developing to
determine whether the imposition of GPS constitutes punishment or

184. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 3004 (establishing lifetime monitoring by GPS for those
individuals convicted of an offense that requires lifetime registration); Ga. Code Ann. § 42-1-14(e)
(requiring lifetime monitoring for sexually dangerous predators); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:560.4
(requiring lifetime electronic monitoring for sexually violent predators and child sexual predators);
Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.285(1) (authorizing lifetime electronic monitoring); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 217.735(1), (4) (requiring lifetime monitoring for any offender convicted of any of thirteen listed
offenses).
185. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-923(c)(1)(a)\; Ga. Code Ann. § 42-1-14(e); Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 265, § 47; Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.285(2); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-540(K).
186. Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 Duke L.J. 1321, 1333, 1337 (2008) (“[E]lectronic
monitoring requirements tend to be triggered by broad categorical classifications based on prior
conviction without regard to present status within the criminal justice system.”); see Commonwealth v.
Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 193 (Mass. 2009) (“[T]he GPS requirement [is] uniformly imposed on every
defendant . . . without regard to present dangerousness, and even if there are no exclusion zones that
can reasonably be applied to the defendant.”). For examples of codification of these principles, see
Cal. Penal Code § 3004 (requiring lifetime GPS monitoring for every offender convicted of an
offense for which lifetime registration is required); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.40 (imposing satellitebased monitoring on any offender who falls within one of the three delineated categories of
offenders).
187. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 47.
188. Cory, 911 N.E.2d at 197–98.
189. Id. at 197.
190. See State Statutes Related to Jessica’s Law, supra note 180 (listing a number of statutes that
require electronic monitoring of convicted sex offenders who are subject to registration as a result of
their conviction).
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whether it can be viewed as one burden among many in a civil regulatory
191
scheme.

F. On the Horizon: Even Harsher Legislation
SORNA and its progeny have not proven to be the final word on
sex offender legislation. A review of proposed federal and state
legislation indicates that we have yet to reach peak proliferation of these
laws. Proposed congressional bills would: give power to the Secretary of
State to revoke, restrict, or limit a passport issued to an individual who is a
192
require sex offenders to notify
sex offender under the AWA;
193
government agencies when they travel internationally; provide notice to
foreign countries upon the intended travel of a convicted high-risk sex
194
offender; prohibit sex offenders from working in property management
195
or maintenance where they have access to others’ residences; and
196
withdraw burial-related benefits for certain offenders. One bill proposed
197
expanded funding for programs using GPS as a sentencing option.
State proposals are equally extensive and equally random. Proposals
include expanding the list of registerable offenses to include tongue198
kissing of a minor; requiring offenders to register with campus police if
199
attending school; barring sex offenders from attending festivals or
200
participating in Halloween activities; increasing the reach of residency
201
202
restrictions; and requiring weekly registration for homeless offenders.
191. A minority of jurisdictions have determined that GPS is punitive and therefore cannot be
applied retroactively or tacked on as a modification of probation. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Goodwin, 933 N.E.2d 925, 935 (Mass. 2010) (“GPS monitoring, paired with geographic exclusions is so
punitive in effect as to increase significantly the severity of the original probationary conditions . . . .”);
Cory, 911 N.E.2d at 195 (determining that the GPS requirement has a pronounced punitive effect, and
consequently may not be applied retroactively).
192. H.R. 5870, 111th Cong. (2010).
193. Sex Offender Notification of International Travel Act, H.R. 6266, 111th Cong. (2010).
194. International Megan’s Law of 2009, H.R. 1623, 111th Cong. (2009).
195. Safety from Sex Offenders Act of 2011, S. 329, 112th Cong. (2011).
196. Hallowed Grounds Act, H.R. 2355, 112th Cong. (2011).
197. GPS Protection & Safety Act of 2009, H.R. 3528, 111th Cong. (2009) (creating a grant
program to assist states in establishing programs that use GPS to track offenders as an alternative to
incarceration).
198. Va. Code Ann. §§ 9.1–902, 18.2-370.6 (2011).
199. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:542(B)(3) (2011).
200. Tighter Restrictions for Registered Sex Offenders Under Proposed County Ordinance
Amendment, Lake Elsinore-Wildomar Patch (Apr. 13, 2011), http://lakeelsinore-wildomar.patch.com/
articles/tighter-restrictions-for-registered-sex-offenders-under-proposed-county-ordinance-ammendment.
Florida’s sex offender statute already prohibits any offender convicted of an offense against a victim
who was under eighteen years of age at the time of the offense, absent a pardon or release from the
requirement to register, from
distributing candy or other items to children on Halloween; wearing a Santa Claus costume,
or other costume to appeal to children, on or preceding Christmas; wearing an Easter Bunny
costume, or other costume to appeal to children, on or preceding Easter; entertaining at
children's parties; or wearing a clown costume without prior approval from the commission.
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II. Regulatory vs. Punitive: A Primer on the Difference
To characterize a particular piece of legislation as “civil” or
“punitive” defines the rights and obligations that flow from that
classification. Sometimes labels matter. Laws deemed civil or regulatory
in nature need not meet constitutional demands traditionally associated
with criminal laws.
Most drafted legislation is easily ascribed to one camp or the other,
but as the Supreme Court observed, “The notion of punishment, as we
commonly understand it, cuts across the division between civil and
203
criminal.” That comment aptly describes sex offender registration
schemes, which share the characteristics both of a civil regulation
designed to protect the public and of a system of punitive burdens
imposed on the registrant’s liberty. In fact, Justice Souter made that
particular observation in Smith v. Doe when he stated, “[T]he indications
of punitive character . . . and the civil indications . . . are in rough
204
equipoise.” A New York trial court framed well the tension of
competing regulatory and penal policies in affixing the appropriate label
when it noted that a residency restriction was intended to “protect
children” but “[o]n the other hand . . . also intended to increase
205
punishment against convicted sex offenders.”
Where legislation can be cast as either civil or criminal, the Supreme
206
Court’s decision in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez shapes the inquiry.
207
Called the “intent-effects test,” courts readily acknowledge a two-step
208
process for making the determination. The first step of the inquiry is to
resolve whether the legislature intended the statute to be a civil remedy

Fla. Stat. § 947.1405(12) (2011) (emphasis added).
201. John Lyon & Rob Moritz, Bill to Tighten Sex Offender Rules Passes House, Ark. News (Feb.
28, 2011), http://arkansasnews.com/2011/02/28/bill-to-tighten-sex-offender-passes-house (reporting on a
bill to increase residency restrictions for level two sex offenders to match restrictions for level three
and four offenders).
202. Ala. Code § 15-20A-12(b) (2011).
203. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447–48 (1989) (assessing whether civil fines constituted
a second punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause).
204. 538 U.S. 84, 110 (2003) (Souter, J. concurring). Justice Souter concluded, “[W]hat tips the
scale for me is the presumption of constitutionality normally accorded a State’s law.” Id. Other courts
that have upheld such laws also have acknowledged that the question is a close one. See, e.g.,
Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
205. Berlin v. Evans, 923 N.Y.S.2d 828, 834 (Sup. Ct. 2011).
206. 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963) (articulating seven factors to be used to determine whether a
regulation is punitive).
207. See People v. Logan, 705 N.E.2d 152, 158–60 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (applying the MendozaMartinez test, which it labeled the “intent-effects test,” to determine whether a sex offender
registration statute was constitutional).
208. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (describing the two levels of inquiry
required to determine the issue); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1980); State v. Lomas,
955 P.2d 678, 680 (Nev. 1998) (describing a two-part test to be applied to determine whether
revocation of a driver’s license was punishment).
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209

or a punishment. Assuming the legislature intended the law to be
210
civil, the second step of the inquiry is whether, despite regulatory aims,
the law is so punitive in fact that it “may not be legitimately viewed as
211
civil in nature.”
In the case of sex offender registration laws, the first step of the
inquiry has been resolved without much debate: Courts have regularly
found that legislatures intended registration schemes to be civil remedies
212
and not punishment. On occasion, a court will rely on the fact that the
213
legislature placed the registration scheme outside the criminal code.
But in most cases, the legislative preamble articulates a nonpunitive civil
214
purpose. The legislative findings recorded in Idaho’s Sexual Offender

209. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 277 (1996) (describing the first stage of inquiry into
whether double jeopardy applied as whether Congress intended the forfeiture law to be a “remedial
civil sanction”); see also Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 (scrutinizing as a first stage of inquiry whether it was
clear that Congress intended to impose a civil penalty upon the defendant); Femedeer v. Haun,
227 F.3d 1244, 1248 (10th Cir. 2000) (utilizing the intents-effects test); Lescher v. Fla. Dep’t of
Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 985 So. 2d 1078, 1082 (Fla. 2008) (analyzing whether the Florida
legislature intended a law that permanently revoked driver licenses to be a civil regulation or a
punishment). In the area of sex offender registration, see Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 433 (N.J. 1995)
(describing the first part of the intent-effects test).
210. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103 (“It is evident that Congress intended the . . . money penalties
and debarment sanctions imposed for violations of 12 U.S.C. §§ 84 and 375b to be civil in nature.”);
Ward, 448 U.S. at 248–49 (recognizing clear congressional intent to characterize monetary penalties
under the Clean Water Act as civil in nature); Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 428 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a law disqualifying drug offenders from receiving food stamp benefits was a civil remedy
because of congressional intent to confer authority to an administration agency).
211. Ursery, 518 U.S. at 288 (deciding whether in rem civil forfeiture was so extreme and
disproportionate in comparison to the government’s damages that it had to be considered punitive);
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (determining whether civil fines added to criminal
penalties violated the Double Jeopardy Clause).
212. See, e.g., Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1249 (declaring that the intent of the legislature “was clearly to
establish a civil remedy”); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 443 (Ky. 2009) (analyzing the
express and implied intent of the legislature to conclude that the registration scheme was civil); State
v. Haskell, 784 A.2d 4, 16 (Me. 2001) (adopting the legislature’s express statement that SORNA was
intended to be civil). But see Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1007–08 (Alaska 2008) (refusing to analyze
the law under the first step of the intents-effects test because the law was punitive in its effect);
Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 379 (Ind. 2009) (observing that the legislature’s intent was not clear
from the record).
213. See, e.g., State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 16 (Me. 2009) (noting that the placement of Maine’s
registration and notification laws “entirely outside of the Criminal Code” was one indicia that the
scheme was intended to be a civil regulation).
214. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 68–69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (relying on the
legislative preamble to confirm that the statute was enacted with a civil purpose). Legislative
preambles regularly state that the registration scheme was enacted as a civil measure. See, e.g., Ark.
Code Ann. § 12-12-902 (2011) (“[P]rotecting the public from sex offenders is a primary governmental
interest, and . . . the privacy interest of the persons adjudicated guilty of sex offenses is less important
than the government’s interest in public safety.”); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 34-A, § 11201 (2011) (“The
purpose of this chapter is to protect the public from potentially dangerous registrants and offenders by
enhancing access to information concerning those registrants and offenders.”); Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 28.721a (2011) (“The legislature has determined that a person who has been convicted of committing
an offense covered by this act poses a potential serious menace and danger to the health, safety,
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215

offer a

The legislature finds that sexual offenders present a danger and that
efforts of law enforcement agencies to protect their communities,
conduct investigations and quickly apprehend offenders who commit
sexual offenses are impaired by the lack of current information
available about individuals who have been convicted of sexual offenses
who live within their jurisdiction. The legislature further finds that
providing public access to certain information about convicted sexual
216
offenders assists parents in the protection of their children.

However, the intent-effects test emphasizes that, even if a
legislature intends a statute to serve a purpose other than punishment,
the statute may nonetheless be deemed to impose a criminal penalty if
the statutory scheme is “so punitive either in purpose or effect . . . as to
transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal
217
penalty.” Consequently, the judicial task has been to discern narrowly
tailored legislation designed to meet regulatory aims from legislation that
is excessive in relation to its nonpunitive purpose.
To help resolve whether a particular piece of legislation is excessive,
Mendoza-Martinez identified seven factors to guide the determination of
whether a law is punitive in nature despite its civil rhetoric:
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
[2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment[,] [3]
whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution
and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already
a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally
be connected is assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive in
218
relation to the alternative purpose assigned . . . .

morals, and welfare of the people, and particularly the children, of this state.”).
215. Idaho Code Ann. § 18-8301 (2011).
216. Id. § 18-8302; see Ark Code Ann. § 12-12-902 (2011) (“The General Assembly finds that sex
offenders pose a high risk of reoffending after release from custody, that protecting the public from
sex offenders is a primary governmental interest, that the privacy interest of persons adjudicated guilty
of sex offenses is less important than the government’s interest in public safety, and that the release of
certain information about sex offenders to criminal justice agencies and the general public will assist in
protecting public safety.”); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:540 (2011) (“[P]rotection of the public from sex
offenders, sexually violent predators, and child predators is of paramount governmental interest.”);
Miss. Code Ann. § 45-33-21 (2011) (“The Legislature finds that the danger of recidivism posed by
criminal sex offenders and the protection of the public from these offenders is of paramount concern
and interest to government.”).
217. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted); see United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447–48 (1989) (concluding that an excessive fine
was punishment because there was no rational relationship to the remedial purpose of compensating
the government); United States v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924, 940–41 (9th Cir. 2009) (determining
that the public dissemination of a juvenile sex offender’s information is punitive in effect because of
the high degree of confidentiality afforded juveniles).
218. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1962). The multifactored MendozaMartinez test is not free from criticism. See, e.g., Artway v. N.J. Att’y Gen., 81 F.3d 1235, 1263 (3d Cir.
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While all seven Mendoza-Martinez factors inform this inquiry, the
Court cautioned that so great is the weight given to the legislature’s
regulatory aim that “[a]bsent conclusive evidence . . . as to the penal
220
nature of a statute,” the Court will not upset a civil characterization.
Even where a law may have punitive characteristics, the State’s interest
in creating a regulatory scheme will override the punitive nature of the
221
law. Indeed, only the “clearest proof” of punition will outweigh
222
countervailing legislative intent.
Requiring “clearest proof” to overturn legislative intent is not
unusual, nor does it apply only to the Mendoza-Martinez analysis. Cast in
other terms, it merely demonstrates the Court’s adherence to the
fundamental principle that great deference is afforded to legislative
223
authority to create and define an offense. Indeed, the presumption of
224
constitutionality cloaks all legislation. Justice Souter’s concurrence in
Smith v. Doe underscored this point when he stated, “What tips the scale

1996) (crafting a three-prong test analyzing the (1) actual purpose, (2) objective purpose, and (3) effect
of a regulation to determine whether it imposed a civil or a criminal penalty); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d
367, 388 (N.J. 1995) (“But while the role of these constitutional provisions as protectors of individual
rights must always be fully enforced, care should be exercised not to convert them into obstacles that
prevent the enactment of honestly-motivated remedial legislation by subjecting laws to tests [such as
Mendoza-Martinez] unsuited to the underlying purpose of these constitutional provisions.”).
219. See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 379–84 (Ind. 2009) (analyzing in detail each of the seven
Mendoza-Martinez factors in determining that Indiana’s sex offender registration scheme was
punitive).
220. 372 U.S. at 169; see Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (“[T]he presumption of
constitutionality with which this enactment, like any other, comes to us forbids us lightly to choose that
reading of the statute's setting which will invalidate it over that which will save it.”).
221. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364–65 (1984) (finding that
a law requiring the forfeiture of firearms sold by unlicensed dealers was intended by Congress as a
civil regulatory measure).
222. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617 (“[O]nly the clearest proof could suffice to establish the
unconstitutionality of a statute on such a ground.”); see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 107 (2002)
(Souter, J., concurring) (“‘[O]nly the clearest proof’ that a law is punitive based on substantial factors
will be able to overcome the legislative categorization.”); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361
(1997) (espousing that only “the clearest proof” will work to override legislative intent to enact a
remedial measure and turn it into a criminal penalty); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986)
(indicating that the civil label may be rebutted by the clearest proof that it is punitive); United States
v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980). But see Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“I would not demand ‘the clearest proof’ that the statute is in effect criminal rather than civil. Instead,
guided by [Mendoza-Martinez], I would neutrally evaluate the Act’s purposes and effects.”); United
States v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d at 931 (noting the impossibility of the defendant being able to develop a
“record which contains the ‘clearest proof’ of the punitive effects that the law will have upon him”).
223. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (recognizing that courts give considerable
weight to legislative authority to define an offense); see also Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,
424 (1985) (“The definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature . . . .”);
Chi., Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559, 578 (1911) (“The power of the
legislature to declare an offense . . . cannot, we think, be questioned.”).
224. See, e.g., State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 12 (Me. 2009) (“A statute is presumed to be constitutional
and the person challenging the constitutionality has the burden of establishing its infirmity.”).
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for me [in this close question] is the presumption of constitutionality
225
normally accorded a State’s law.”
Wide latitude, however, does not translate to unchecked legislative
freedom. Legislatures may not exercise their power to draft or modify
226
laws free of all constitutional restraint. Consequently, courts regularly
strike down laws that, despite a particular legislative intent, have been
227
deemed to violate constitutional principles.
And herein lies the critical threshold issue: Can it be said that
ramped-up sex offender registration laws continue to warrant the label of
civil remedial sanctions, or have they morphed into criminal penalties
cloaked in civil rhetoric? The balance of the Article argues that under
the Mendoza-Martinez multifactored test, spiraling amendments have
228
tipped the schemes to the punitive —and that tip unravels their
229
constitutionality.

III. Proving Punition
Excessive legislation may prove to be SORNA’s Achilles’ heel. This
Part argues that escalating burdens have cast a net far wider than
rationally related to a civil alternative purpose. And because of overly
broad legislation, super-registration schemes (1) impose a significant
affirmative restraint not previously considered, and (2) when viewed
cumulatively and collectively, are so excessive that they are no longer
rationally connected to their nonpunitive purpose.
As noted earlier, when a law is deemed to be punitive, substantive
and procedural constitutional protections must flow from that
230
determination. One constitutional limitation on criminal legislation is
231
the Ex Post Facto Clause, which prohibits retroactive application of a
law that “inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime,
232
when committed.” Ex post facto challenges have arisen in a variety of

225. 538 U.S. at 110 (Souter, J., concurring).
226. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking down a Texas law that
criminalized sodomy).
227. See id. at 564 (concluding that a statute prohibiting certain sexual behavior between
consenting adults intruded on a liberty interest); Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 68 (Nev. 2001) (declaring
that the legislature’s attempt to abolish the insanity defense violated principles of due process).
228. For the landmark discussion of the social phenomenon of tipping points, see Malcolm
Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (2000). For
examples of a variety of legal scholarship on this phenomenon, see Carpenter, supra note 3, at 1 n.1.
229. See State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011) (determining that, in the aggregate,
Ohio’s amended sex offender scheme had become punitive).
230. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S 242, 248 (1980) (“The distinction between a civil penalty
and a criminal penalty is of some constitutional import.”).
231. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 (“No state shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law . . . .”).
232. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798); see Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43
(1990) (“Legislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment
for criminal acts.”). But see Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 250 (2001) (determining that the
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contexts. Litigants have challenged whether sanctions, such as the
imposition of fines or forfeiture of property were, in fact, criminal
233
penalties governed by the constraints of the ex post facto principle.
To date, registrants have rarely been successful in mounting ex post
facto challenges because of the difficulty they face in meeting the
234
Mendoza-Martinez requirements to prove punition. Additionally, there
is great pushback from legislators, who argue for retroactive application
of the laws because of the high incidence of recidivism among sex
235
offenders. The argument continues: Effectiveness of enforcement,
therefore, necessitates that these laws apply to all offenders, including
those never subjected to registration when first convicted, as well as
those who had been adjudged lower risk under previous but more lenient
236
versions of the scheme. After all, an act’s influence would dilute
significantly if registration laws exempted previously convicted offenders
237
thought to be dangerous to the public. In Doe v. Poritz, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey adopted this rationale when it accepted the state’s
position that “there was no justification in protecting only children of the
238
future from the risk of reoffense.”

commitment of sexually violent felons was a civil remedy that did not implicate either the Ex Post
Facto Clause or the Double Jeopardy Clause).
233. See, e.g., Youngblood, 497 U.S. at 44 (rejecting the contention that an after-imposed fine
constitutes an ex post facto criminal penalty); see also United States v. Reed, 924 F.2d 1014, 1016–17
(11th Cir. 1991) (concluding that forfeiture of substituted property did not violate ex post facto
principles); United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 836 F. Supp. 1147, 1162 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (opining that the
forfeiture statute in question was civil and consequently not affected by ex post facto principles). For a
rich discussion on the application of ex post facto principles to quasi-criminal penalties, see Harold J.
Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 Geo. L.J. 2143,
2149 (1996) (contending that the Supreme Court has been “surprisingly permissive” in the civil
context).
234. See sources cited supra note 233. In the state courts, there has been a notable shift, as three
jurisdictions have concluded that registration schemes violate ex post facto principles because they are
punitive. See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4 (Me. 2009);
State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 2011).
235. In part, this was the Government’s contention in Carr v. United States, which addressed the
narrow question of whether criminal penalties for an offender’s failure to register upon moving across
state lines should apply to offenders who did so prior to SORNA’s enactment. See 130 S. Ct. 2229,
2240–41 (2010). The amicus brief filed in Smith v. Doe by the Council of State Governments, the
National Governors Association, and a number of other entities, also provides an excellent example of
the argument. See Brief for Council of State Gov’ts et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (No. 01-729), 2002 WL 1268682.
236. See Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2238, 2240–41 (criticizing the government’s argument that subjecting
pre-SORNA offenders to travel restrictions is a necessary law enforcement tool).
237. See United States v. Fuller, 627 F.3d 499, 505–06 (2d Cir. 2010) (adopting the Attorney
General’s position that applying SORNA to offenders convicted prior to the enactment of the Act was
central to the enforcement of a comprehensive system).
238. 662 A.2d 367, 373 (N.J. 1995). The Poritz court further observed that if the notification law
had exempted previously convicted offenders, “the law would have provided absolutely no protection
whatsoever on the day it became law, for it would have applied to no one.” Id.
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However compelling this argument appears at first glance,
retroactive application of any law is valid only if the law is deemed to be
remedial in nature. By a vote of 5–4, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe
concluded exactly that. It held that the first generation of sex offender
registration laws, represented by the Alaska Sex Offender Registry Act,
did not violate ex post facto principles because sex offender registration
239
schemes cannot be characterized as punishment.
At first blush, one might suppose that the nonapplicability of ex post
facto principles to sex offender registration schemes is a settled issue
because of the Court’s ruling in Smith. Certainly, the Seventh Circuit so
concluded when it wrote, “[W]hether a comprehensive registration
regime targeting only sex offenders is penal . . . is not an open
240
question.” Indeed, perhaps in deference to what it perceived to be the
controlling federal principle from Smith, the Indiana Supreme Court in
2009 based its determination that Indiana registration laws violated ex
post facto principles on adequate and independent state constitutional
241
grounds, rather than on federal ex post facto principles.
242
However “tempting” it is to conclude that Smith controls, it would
be a mistake to do so because the statutory landscape has so dramatically
243
altered. While one can argue the merits of the Smith decision—that is,
whether punitive indices were sufficiently present in 2003 to warrant a
different conclusion—significant changes to registration schemes prompt
the following question: Can it be argued that super-registration schemes
post-SORNA include the very characteristics the Court found lacking in
2003?

239. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003) (“Our examination of the Act’s effects leads to the
determination that respondents cannot show, much less by the clearest proof, that the effects of the
law negate Alaska's intention to establish a civil regulatory scheme. The Act is nonpunitive, and its
retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.”).
240. United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2011). Although the 2010 Supreme Court
decision in Carr addressed an ex post facto challenge, the opinion never grappled with the
fundamental issue of whether sex offender registration schemes were punitive, relying instead on
statutory construction to determine that burdens attached to failure to register were intended to apply
only to prospective travelers. See 130 S. Ct. at 2237.
241. Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 377–78 (Ind. 2009). For a similar response, see Doe v. State,
189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008) (holding that Alaska’s registration and notification law violated the ex post
facto clause of Alaska’s state constitution).
242. See United States v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 2009) (“It would be tempting to
conclude, without looking carefully at the special circumstances of former juvenile offenders, that in
light of [Smith v. Doe] sex offender registration by its nature does not constitute punishment.”).
Although the Ninth Circuit concluded that Smith v. Doe may not always control, it nonetheless
accorded deference to the Court’s decision. See id. at 932.
243. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (“The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to
the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law. It is not, however, an
inexorable command.”). For an interesting discussion on the role of stare decisis in judicial
decisionmaking in the United States, see Mortimer N.S. Sellers, The Doctrine of Precedent in the
United States of America, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 67 (2006).
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A. Affirmative Disability or Restraint
At its paradigmatic core, the term “affirmative disability or
244
restraint” employed in Mendoza-Martinez refers to imprisonment or an
245
act that is akin to loss of freedom. In the seminal case Hudson v. United
States, the Court viewed debarment from the banking industry as not
“involv[ing] ‘an affirmative disability or restraint’ as that term is
normally understood. While petitioners have been prohibited from
participating in the banking industry, this is certainly nothing
246
approaching the infamous punishment of imprisonment.” Relying on
the Hudson framework—imprisonment versus anything short of loss of
freedom—courts have concluded, often summarily, that the following
laws do not impose an affirmative disability or restraint: the denial of
247
permanent revocation of one’s driver’s
Social Security benefits,
248
249
license, withdrawal of the right to food stamps, cancellation of an
250
alcoholic beverage license, and termination of ownership rights in
251
horses.
Unfortunately, the Hudson line of cases does not offer sufficient
direction because burdens demanded of sex offender registrants require
more detailed analysis than the perfunctory “this is not imprisonment”
analysis offered by those cases. Smith v. Doe helps shape the inquiry on
whether registrants suffer from an affirmative disability or restraint as
252
Using traditional definitions of
used in Mendoza-Martinez.
punishment, the Court posed three questions to determine whether the
law imposed a physical restraint or disability: (1) whether the law
involves physical restraint; (2) if no physical restraint, whether the law
involves a restriction on activities that could otherwise be considered
restraint; and (3) if no restraint, either physically or effectively, whether
the sanctions imposed involve the type of shame and humiliation
253
traditionally associated with shaming punishments from colonial times.

244. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104 (1997) (distinguishing between disbarment from
the banking industry and the “‘infamous punishment’ of imprisonment”).
245. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997) (recognizing an individual’s constitutionally
protected interest in avoiding physical restraint); see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 111 (2003)
(Stevens J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“Proper analysis . . . begin[s] with a
consideration of the impact of the statutes on the registrants’ freedom.”).
246. 522 U.S. at 104 (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
247. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (“Here the sanction is the mere denial of a
noncontractual government benefit. No affirmative disability or restraint is imposed . . . .”).
248. See, e.g., Lescher v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 985 So. 2d 1078 (Fla.
2008); State v. Evans, 550 S.E.2d 853 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
249. See Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 431 (7th Cir. 2000).
250. See Ex Parte Sheridan, 974 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App. 1998).
251. See State v. Almendarez, 301 S.W.3d 886, 892–93 (Tex. App. 2009).
252. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2003).
253. Id. at 98–101.
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Having concluded that registration and notification schemes do not
254
involve physical or effective restraints, the Court considered whether
255
they nonetheless equal shaming punishments from colonial times.
Although Smith v. Doe analyzed specifically the Alaska Sex Offender
Registry Act, the Court offered comparative analogies to distinguish sex
offender registration schemes from historical noncorporal acts
traditionally deemed punishment. To this end, the Court identified
256
hallmarks of shaming punishments to include: banishment, loss of
257
258
freedom of movement, public shame and humiliation, occupational or
259
housing disadvantages, and conditions analogous to probation or
260
The majority found these indices lacking in
supervised release.
sufficient degree to warrant a finding that the Alaska Sex Offender
261
Registry was punitive. Today, however, super-registration schemes are
readily identifiable by these hallmarks of shaming.
1. Banishment
Banishment defines the most serious of colonial shaming
262
punishments. Historical banishment involved “[expulsion] from the
community,” where “[the offenders] could neither return to their original
community nor, reputation tarnished, be admitted easily into a new
263
one.” By contrast, the Smith v. Doe Court found that sex offender
registrants were not effectively banished from their communities;
registrants were “free to move where they wish and to live and work as
264
other citizens, with no supervision.”
That assumption is no longer accurate given the sweeping nature of
265
Today, in the vast majority of
current residency restrictions.

254. Id. at 98–99.
255. Id. at 99–100.
256. Id. at 99–101.
257. Id. at 99.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 100.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 97–102. Separate dissents by Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justice Breyer) and Justice
Stevens vehemently opposed the characterization that sex offender registration laws did not involve
affirmative disabilities or restraints. See id. at 111 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part)
(“The statutes impose significant affirmative obligations and a severe stigma on every person to whom
they apply.”); id. at 115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Beyond doubt, the Act involves an ‘affirmative
disability or restraint.’”).
262. Id. at 98 (majority opinion).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 101; see Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 719 (8th Cir. 2005) (determining that Iowa’s
residency restrictions did not affect banishment because they only restricted where offenders may
reside as opposed to expelling them from communities or prohibiting access to areas near schools or
child-care facilities).
265. See State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 1153 (Ind. 2009) (“Restricting the residence of
offenders based on conduct that may have nothing to do with crimes against children, and without
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communities, registrants are not free to live or work where they wish.
The Smith Court’s observation that Alaskan registrants were free to
move about the state only underscores the how quickly the landscape of
registration schemes is changing. The Supreme Court of Kentucky,
commenting on case law that had addressed this issue, observed that
although a majority of courts had “avoided or sidestepped” the issue of
whether residency restrictions constitute banishment, dissenting judges
have been “far more intellectually honest concluding that residency
267
restrictions constitute banishment.”
Indeed, this is the face of modern day banishment. Stories
corroborate the assessment that offenders are made homeless or
268
transient because of residency restrictions. For example, in South
Florida, a group of convicted offenders huddle “under the Julia Tuttle
Causeway, which spans Miami’s Biscayne Bay,” in squalid living
conditions because there is no community in South Florida where they
269
may reside without violating residency restrictions. One offender, who
had moved from Ohio to Kentucky because of Ohio’s residency
restrictions, was arrested in Kentucky “for living within 1000 feet of East
270
Covered Bridge Park, allegedly a public playground.” In Manhattan, a
seventy-seven-year-old convicted offender was banished from his
residence of over forty years because of amended New York residency
271
restrictions. Homeless offenders in Suffolk County, New York, “were
crammed into a trailer that periodically moved around until finally
272
settling on the grounds of the county jail.” In Georgia, a registrant,
peacefully residing in his community with his wife, was almost forced to
leave it when child-care facilities sprung up within 1000 feet of his home

considering whether a particular offender is a danger to the general public, the statute exceeds its nonpunitive purposes.”).
266. See supra Part I.D. (describing the impact of residency restrictions on registrants’ movement).
267. Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 444 (Ky. 2009).
268. See, e.g., Mann v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 755 (Ga. 2007) (“[I]t is apparent that
there is no place in Georgia where a registered sex offender can live without being continually at risk
of being ejected.”); see also Wendy Koch, More Sex Offenders Transient, Elusive: Homeless Life May
Increase Crime Risk, USA Today, Nov. 19, 2007, at A1 (“Residency restrictions are the linchpin for
causing homelessness among sex offenders.”).
269. Skipp & Campo-Flores, supra note 49; see also Skipp, supra note 49. So well-known are the
conditions of the Julia Tuttle Causeway that a recent episode of a television show depicted the
protagonist searching for someone among groups of sex offenders who had set up camp under the
bridge. See Dexter: First Blood (Showtime television broadcast Oct. 24, 2010).
270. Baker, 295 S.W.3d at 441. The court in that case noted that “the Division of Probation and
Parole provided [the offender] with a link to a website to determine whether he was in compliance
with [Kentucky’s residency restrictions]. The website did not show East Covered Bridge Park and the
surrounding area to be a prohibited zone.” Id.
271. See Berlin v. Evans, 923 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829, 831–32 (Sup. Ct. 2011).
272. Skipp & Campo-Flores, supra note 49 (exposing the unintended consequences of residency
restrictions).
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and business. To compound the injury, he had already been forced to
vacate another residence three years earlier because of Georgia’s
274
residency restriction statutes.
2. Loss of Freedom of Movement
Offenders suffer serious restrictions on their freedom of movement.
In addition to constructive banishment, the introduction of residency
restrictions and GPS monitoring systems have affected offenders’ ability
to integrate into communities, find stable homes, and obtain steady
employment. As the Ohio Supreme Court persuasively articulated in
State v. Williams, it is the cumulative effect of all of these requirements—
not a separate analysis of each burden—that accurately portrays the
275
effect these requirements have on the offenders subject to them.
The burdens associated with periodic registration can be
276
significantly intrusive. In 2003, in response to that concern, Smith v.
Doe theorized that the lack of in-person registration helped refute the
277
claim that offenders were under an affirmative disability. Within a few
years, when in-person registration had become the norm, Maine’s
Supreme Court reasoned that
it belies common sense to suggest that a newly imposed lifetime
obligation to report to a police station every ninety days to verify one’s
identification, residence, and school, and to submit to fingerprinting
and provide a current photograph, is not a substantial disability or
278
restraint on the free exercise of individual liberty.

While in-person registration is “continuing, intrusive, and
279
a requirement that a GPS device be permanently
humiliating,”
attached to an offender’s person is “dramatically more intrusive and

273. Mann v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 742 (Ga. 2007) (finding Georgia’s residency
restrictions unconstitutional insofar as they permitted the regulatory taking of the defendant’s home
without just compensation, but determining that the defendant had failed to establish that the work
restriction prohibiting him from entering his business had a sufficient economic impact).
274. Mann v. State, 603 S.E.2d 283, 285–86 (Ga. 2004).
275. Compare State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011) (finding that all of the changes
enacted by recent amendments to Ohio’s sex offender laws in the aggregate, rather than any one
change in particular, warranted the conclusion that imposing the current registration requirements on
an offender whose crime was committed prior to the amendments is punitive), with Femedeer v. Haun,
227 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2000) (analyzing the effect of Utah’s Internet notification scheme by itself in
determining that the notification scheme imposed only a “civil burden” on sex offenders).
276. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1009 (Alaska 2008) (describing registration requirements
as “significant and intrusive”); see also Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 379 (Ind. 2009)
(acknowledging the burdensome nature of in-home personal visitation to verify an offender’s address);
State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 24–25 (Me. 2009) (recognizing the burden associated with the
requirement to register in-person every ninety days).
277. See 538 U.S. 84, 101 (2003).
278. Letalien, 985 A.2d at 24–25 (explaining the new burdens imposed on lifetime registrants
following the 1999 amendments to the state’s 1995 registration law).
279. Doe v. Dist. Att’y, 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1016 (Mass. 1997) (Fried, J., concurring).
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burdensome.” A GPS monitoring device affects an offender’s ability to
travel by airplane; to bathe, swim, scuba dive, camp, or travel to rural
281
areas; and even the ability to enter certain buildings. Though the North
Carolina Supreme Court recognized that the state’s satellite-based
282
monitoring program “may affect a participant’s daily activities,” it
ultimately found that neither the purpose nor the effect of the program
283
negated the legislature’s civil intent in implementing it.
In stark contrast to the view of the Supreme Court of North
284
Carolina, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has determined that GPS
monitoring renders a registration statute punitive in effect because it
imposes a substantial burden on liberty as part of an offender’s sentence
“in two ways: by its permanent, physical attachment to the offender, and
285
by its continuous surveillance of the offender’s activities.” And because
GPS monitoring is imposed as part of an offender’s sentence for certain
crimes, the Massachusetts Supreme Court determined that the statute is
286
punitive in effect.

280. Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 196 (Mass. 2009).
281. See State v. Bowditch, 700 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. 2010). As the court explained, the transmitting
device used for North Carolina’s program required periodic recharging and could lose its satellite
connection in some buildings or if submerged underwater. Id. The transmitting device was worn on a
belt around the shoulder or waist and could not be hidden under clothing. Id.
282. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
283. Id. at 11 (“[The requirements necessary to operate [satellite-based monitoring] ‘make a valid
regulatory program effective and do not impose punitive restraints.’” (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S.
84, 102 (2003))).
284. Id. (determining that the effects of GPS monitoring were “no more onerous than the harsh
effects of the regulations found to be nonpunitive in occupational debarment cases” and in cases of
civil confinement).
285. In Cory, 911 N.E.2d at 196, the Massachusetts Supreme Court explained,
There is no context other than punishment in which the State physically attaches an item to
a person, without consent and also without consideration of individual circumstances, that
must remain attached for a period of years and may not be tampered with or removed on
penalty of imprisonment. Such an imposition is a serious, affirmative restraint.
286. Id. at 197; see Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 933 N.E.2d 925, 935 (Mass. 2010). When
registration is required as part of a defendant’s sentence, retroactive application of new registration
requirements, like additional conditions of probation, is an unconstitutional modification of, and
enhancement to, the offender’s criminal sentence. See People v. Castellanos, 982 P.2d 211, 222 (Cal.
1999) (Kennard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“If the legislature intended the sanction
to be imposed in a criminal proceeding it probably intended the sanction to be punitive. Probably, but
not necessarily.”); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 20 (Me. 2009) (declaring that registration was required
as “an integral part of the criminal sentencing process and resulting sentence” for the offender’s crime,
so that retroactive application of SORNA made more burdensome the punishment for a crime after its
commission).
The first wave of sex offender statutes subjected offenders to registration as part of their criminal
sentence. More recently, in an effort to avoid those constitutional protections necessary to the
retroactive enforcement of criminal laws, many states have since required that registration be imposed
at the time the court imposes a sentence rather than as part of the offender’s sentence. See, e.g., Doe v.
Dist. Att’y, 932 A.2d 552, 564 (Me. 2007) (Alexander & Silver, JJ., concurring) (describing the change
in Maine’s law).
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Residency restrictions and exclusion zones impose yet another
affirmative disability on registered offenders. Residency restrictions have
an almost unbearable impact on a registered sex offender’s ability to
move freely. The threat of eviction hangs over the heads of registered
offenders because there is always the potential that the offender will be
forced from any new residence whenever a third party chooses to
establish within the exclusion zone a business that statutorily bars sex
287
offenders.
In fact, exclusion zones do not prohibit only residency; in some cases
288
they attempt to prohibit movement. Massachusetts, for example,
sought to establish exclusion zones that would not only prevent offenders
from living in areas where they might come into contact with children,
“but even from passing through such areas while driving to another
289
destination.” When used together, GPS monitoring plus geographic
exclusion zones “could dramatically limit an offender’s freedom of
290
movement.” As one commentator observed, exclusion zones, residency
restrictions, and electronic monitoring programs have severely limited a
registrant’s freedom of movement without the state ever having to erect
291
a single wall around the registrant.
3. Public Shame and Humiliation
Despite the long line of cases concluding that sex offender
292
registration schemes are nonpunitive civil regulations,
courts
nonetheless recognize that these laws serve to shame, isolate, and
293
ostracize the convicted offender. The question, therefore, is not

287. Mann v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 744 (Ga. 2007); State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145,
1150 (Ind. 2009); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 445 (Ky. 2009); see Brenda Goodman,
Georgia Justices Overturn a Curb on Sex Offenders, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 2007, at A26 (“‘You live kind
of every day wondering if the sheriff’s office is going to come out and tell you that you have three days
to move,’ Mr. Mann said. ‘It’s happened to me twice.’”).
288. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 47 (2011) (“The commissioner of probation, in addition to any
other conditions, shall establish defined geographic exclusion zones including, but not limited to, the
areas in and around the victim’s residence, place of employment and school and other areas defined to
minimize probationer’s contact with children, if applicable.”); see Fla. Stat. § 947.1405(12)(a) (2011)
(permitting the parole commission to designate additional “prohibited locations” to protect a victim).
289. Cory, 911 N.E.2d at 196–97 n.19.
290. Goodwin, 933 N.E.2d at 935 (“[T]he additional probation condition of GPS monitoring,
paired with geographic exclusions, is so punitive in effect as to increase significantly the severity of the
original probationary conditions and therefore may be imposed only after a finding of a violation of a
condition of probation.”).
291. See Murphy, supra note 186, at 1328–29.
292. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 96 (2003); Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1
(2003); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997); Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244. 1253 (10th
Cir. 2000); State v. Haskell, 784 A.2d 4, 14–16 (Me. 2001).
293. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 99 (“It must be acknowledged that notice of a criminal
conviction subjects the offender to public shame, the humiliation increasing in proportion to the extent
of the publicity. And the geographic reach of the Internet is greater than anything which could have
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whether sex offender registrants suffer from some form of public shame
and humiliation. On that, there is agreement. Rather, the question is
whether, given the dramatic changes in registration schemes, registrants
now face public shame and humiliation that rise to the level of historical
notions of punishment.
To traverse this minefield, we must remember that an enduring
tension exists in determining “the exact line at which the dignity and
convenience of the individual must yield to the demands of the public
294
welfare or of private justice.” The compelling arguments for public
dissemination of some information about some sex offenders are real and
they are meaningful. However, wholesale dissemination of information
and effective debarment from employment and housing opportunities
raise the question whether the public shame and humiliation registrants
suffer are too profound to disregard.
In concluding that notification schemes were civil in nature, Smith v.
Doe distinguished the paradigmatic shaming punishments of branding
and other permanent labels from the publicity associated with
295
community notification. However, it is no longer valid to assume that
the shame suffered by registrants is less profound than that suffered by
colonists. Today, registrants suffer the type of permanent stigmas
occasioned in colonial times. Using the analytical framework from Smith,
the town square has been replaced by the Internet, and each time an
offender’s picture is posted online, that registrant is held up for “face-to296
face shaming,” as described in Smith. For one offender, who had been
convicted in 1990 of one count of indecent liberties with an undercover
police officer and fined sixty-two dollars, automatic registration as a tier I
297
offender would have caused untold embarrassment and humiliation. So

been designed in colonial times.”); see also Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 829 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We
can hardly conceive of a state’s action bearing more ‘stigmatizing consequences’ than the labeling of a
prison inmate as a sex offender.”); Doe v. Pryor, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231 (M.D. Ala. 1999)
(“[C]ommunity notification under the Act will seriously damage [a registrant’s] reputation and
standing in the community.”); Ray v. State, 982 P.2d 931, 936 (Idaho 1999) (“[R]egistration brings
notoriety to a person convicted of a sexual offense [and] does prolong the stigma attached to such
convictions.”); Young v. State, 806 A.2d 233, 249 (Md. 2002) (“Being labeled as a sexual offender
within the community can be highly stigmatizing and can carry the potential for social ostracism.”).
294. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 214
(1890).
295. 538 U.S. at 98 (“[T]he stigma of Alaska’s Megan’s Law results not from public display for
ridicule and shaming but from the dissemination of accurate information about a criminal record, most
of which is already public.”); see Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89
Mich. L. Rev. 1880, 1899 (1991) (describing that one classic justification for shaming punishments is
incapacitation, which “holds that punishment should protect the community from the offender”);
Brian J. Telpner, Note, Constructing Safe Communities: Megan’s Laws and the Purposes of
Punishment, 85 Geo. L.J. 2039, 2055 (1997) (arguing that community notification laws constitute
punishment under a “broad, common-sense meaning of the term”).
296. 538 U.S. at 99.
297. Doe v. Att’y Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1009–10 (Mass. 1997) (“He would be embarrassed and
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significant was his perceived shame that this offender “seriously
considered suicide rather than face the humiliation and disgrace of
298
registering as a sex offender.” However, in Roy Martin’s case, the
shame of being reclassified as a tier III offender actually proved too
much: Mr. Martin hanged himself rather than face the burdens associated
299
with that level of registration.
4. Occupational Employment and Housing Disadvantages
Spiraling amendments have severely restricted the registrant’s
300
opportunity for employment and housing. The change is palpable from
2003 when the Smith v. Doe Court commented, “The Act does not
restrain activities sex offenders may pursue but leaves them free to
301
change jobs or residences.” Changing jobs or relocating residences at
will is no longer an option under super-registration schemes. Residency
restrictions have expanded to such a degree that many parts of the
302
country are off-limits to the offender. Employment options are equally
scarce. Faced with scenarios more extreme than those found in Hudson,
303
which involved debarment from only the banking industry, states have
304
barred registrants from all manner of employment. Illustrating this
point is Georgia’s attempt to preclude employment opportunities at any
305
business located near industries affecting children.

humiliated if his children, friends, associates, and co-workers knew that he has had homosexual
experiences.”).
298. Id. at 1009.
299. See Grinberg, supra note 6.
300. See supra Part I (detailing the changes in the new sex offender laws).
301. 538 U.S. at 100; see Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 721 (8th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging that
Iowa’s residency restrictions were more disabling than those at issue in Smith v. Doe, but finding the
statute nonpunitive in part because the restrictions at issue were “certainly less disabling” than civil
commitment schemes); Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1250 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that
registrants were “free to live where they choose, come and go as they please, and seek whatever
employment they may desire.”).
302. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
303. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104–05 (1997) (concluding that debarment from the
banking industry was not sufficiently punitive to outweigh the civil purpose of the sanction, which was
to promote the stability of that industry).
304. See Doe 1 v. Otte, 259 F.3d. 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (“In contrast [to Hudson], the procedures
employed under the Alaska statute are likely to make the plaintiffs completely unemployable.”), rev’d
sub nom. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 83 (2003).
305. See Ga. Code Ann. § 42-1-15 (2011) (prohibiting registrants from working at any child-care
facility, school, or church, “or at any business that is located within 1,000 feet of a child care facility, a
school or church” (emphasis added)); see also La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:553 (2011) (prohibiting
registrants from operating any bus, taxicab, or limousine for hire, and from engaging in employment as
a service worker who goes into a residence to provide any type of service, and specifically prohibiting
any person whose offense involved a minor child from operating any carnival or amusement ride).
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5. Conditions Similar to Probation or Supervised Release
As Mendoza-Martinez illustrates, whether a law promotes
traditional aims of punishment, such as retribution and deterrence, can
306
help determine whether a law is punitive. In considering whether the
obligation of registrants to report regularly to their local law
enforcement was akin to conditions of probation or supervised release,
the Court concluded that certain hallmarks associated with probation or
307
supervised release were not present in the Alaska registration scheme.
For example, the registration scheme did not include mandatory
conditions or the potential for revocation of freedom in case of
308
infraction. Nor did it require the level of in-person registration or the
frequency of registration associated with probation or supervised
309
release. In fact, the lack of in-person registration in Alaska’s scheme
bolstered the Court’s position that registration was not sufficiently
310
similar to supervised release.
Similar to the other assumptions underlying Smith v. Doe, this one
no longer applies. Offenders are not “free to move where they wish and
311
to live and work as other citizens, with no supervision.” Current
registration burdens look like probation or supervised release; they
312
require registration in person as often as every ninety days, as well as a
variety of other mandatory actions that, if not met, threaten the
313
registrant with loss of freedom.

306. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, at 168, 182–83 (1963) (reasoning that the
legislative history, which invited the inference that Congress’s purpose in passing the law at issue was
to inflict effective retribution against draft evaders, confirmed the conclusion that the law was punitive
in nature).
307. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 101 (2003).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. (“[T]he record contains no indication that an in-person appearance requirement has been
imposed on any sex offender subject to the Act.”). Lower courts have relied on the Court’s message in
Smith v. Doe. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (contrasting
numerous in-person registration requirements with the Texas statute, which, for first-time offenders,
requires only one registration per move and registration once per year); McCabe v. Commonwealth,
650 S.E.2d 508, 511 (Va. 2007) (concluding that no liberty interest was affected because of lack of inperson registration).
311. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 101.
312. See e.g., Ohio Rev. Code § 2950.06(B)(3) (West 2011), invalidated by State v. Williams,
952 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 2011).
313. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 933 N.E.2d 925, 927 (Mass. 2010) (concluding that a
court may impose GPS monitoring as an additional condition of a registrant’s probation only if the
registrants violates any of the original conditions); State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108,1111 (Ohio
2011) (noting that failure to comply with certain registration requirements will subject a sex offender
to criminal prosecution). Even in 2003, members of the Court believed that registration requirements
were tantamount to requirements imposed as consequences of other criminal convictions. See Smith v.
Doe, 538 U.S. at 111 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
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B. Excessiveness
The final Mendoza-Martinez factor for determining whether a law is
punitive in nature asks whether the law, in its necessary operation, is
314
excessive in relation to its stated regulatory purpose. If the means
chosen to carry out a law’s nonpunitive purpose are excessive, the law
315
may be deemed punitive in its effect. Courts recognize that this is the
316
most critical of the seven factors.
Although the vast majority of courts have consistently found that
registration and notification schemes are rationally connected to their
317
proposed goal, namely public safety, a fundamental change in these
schemes threatens the legality of this seventh and final factor.
Individualized risk assessment, a mainstay of the previous generation of
318
sex offender schemes, has been replaced by offense-based assessment,
where individuals are assigned to tiers based on the crimes for which they
319
were convicted. In many states, courts are no longer permitted to
314. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963); see Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 97
(majority opinion).
315. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 105 (“The question is whether the regulatory means chosen are
reasonable in light of the non-punitive objective.”); see Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1017 (Alaska 2008)
(“We use ‘means’ here to include the scope of the statute and the obligations it imposes on those
subject to it and what the state can or must do in enforcing it.”).
316. See, e.g., Kellar v. Fayetteville Police Dep’t, 5 S.W.3d 402, 409 (Ark. 1999) (“It is the seventh
and final factor which weighs most heavily in the balance in Arkansas, as in most other states: the
question of whether the Act is excessive in relation to its alternative purposes.”); State v. Myers,
923 P.2d 1024, 1041 (Kan. 1996) (“This is the key factor in our analysis.”); Rodriguez v. State,
93 S.W.3d 60, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“[O]f all of the Kennedy factors, this factor cuts most directly
to the question of which statutes cross the boundaries of civil sanctions, and which do not.”); see also
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 116 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“What ultimately tips the balance for me is
the Act’s excessiveness in relation to its nonpunitive purpose.”).
317. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 102–03; Doe v. State, 189 P.3d at 1015 (“[Alaska’s
registration scheme] can rationally be viewed as advancing a non-punitive purpose.”); Wallace v.
State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009) (“Although [the expansion of Indiana’s sex offender laws]
supports the view that the effects of the Act are punitive, still the Act advances a legitimate regulatory
purpose.”); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 22 (Me. 2009) (“[Maine’s] SORNA . . . was enacted to serve
the legitimate non-punitive purpose of public safety.”).
318. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, § 178E(f) (2011) (permitting the court to relieve a sex
offender of his duty to register if “the circumstances of the offense in conjunction with the offender’s
criminal history indicate that [she] does not pose a risk of reoffense or a danger to the public”); see
also Letalien, 985 A.2d at 8 (reviewing Maine’s 1991 registration law, which allowed a court to waive
registration requirements where good cause was shown); State v. Ellison, 2002-Ohio-4024U, ¶ 22 (Ct.
App.) (explaining that prevailing law at the time of the decision permitted a trial or sentencing court
to employ factors in order to determine whether to classify an offender as a sexual predator).
319. See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d at 1017 (“[O]ffenders cannot shorten their registration or
notification periods even on the clearest determination of rehabilitation . . . .” (quoting Smith v. Doe,
538 U.S. at 117 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting))); In re W.M., 851 A.2d 431, 436 (D.C. 2004) (reporting that
registration requirements are “based on the nature of the offenses . . . committed rather than on an
individualized assessment of [the] risk of recidivism”); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 446
(Ky. 2009) (acknowledging that Kentucky’s residency restrictions apply to certain offenders without
any consideration as to whether they might be a threat to children or to public safety); State v.
Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011) (noting that offenders were no longer entitled to a
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determine whether a registrant poses a risk to society; indeed, many
states expressly prohibit relief from registration or disclosure
321
obligations. In her dissent in Smith v. Doe, Justice Ginsburg expressed
caution regarding the constitutionality of sex offender registration laws
that do not provide for individualized assessment nor offer the registrant
322
the opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation.
The first generation of sex offender legislation permitted trial courts
323
to waive registration requirements for certain individuals, but many
324
states have repealed such provisions. As a result, offenders are no
longer entitled to present any evidence to shorten their registration or
325
notification period. One offender’s story illustrates the damaging effect

hearing to determine whether they would be classified as a sexually oriented offender, habitual sex
offender, or sexual predator under Ohio’s amended sex offender statute); see also Commonwealth v.
Williams, 832 A.2d 962, 965–66 (Pa. 2003) (describing the changes in risk-assessment procedures
required by the court to afford constitutional protections to the registrants).
320. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 189 P.3d at 1017 n.143 (“[Alaska’s registration scheme] does not
authorize a court to determine that a registrant poses no risk to society and consequently to altogether
relieve him of registration and disclosure obligations.”); People v. Hofsheier, 129 P.3d 29, 34 (Cal.
2006) (noting that the duty to register as a sex offender cannot be avoided through a plea bargain or
through the exercise of judicial discretion); Letalien, 985 A.2d at 9–10 (acknowledging that Maine’s sex
offender law was amended to eliminate courts’ ability to waive registration on a showing of reasonable
likelihood that registration was no longer necessary); Williams, 952 N.E.2d at 1113 (noting that judges
are no longer permitted to review a sex offender’s statutory classification).
321. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:542(F)(1) (2011) (“[T]he sex offender registration and
notification requirements required by this Chapter are mandatory and shall not be waived or
suspended by any court.”).
322. 538 U.S. at 117 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“And meriting heaviest weight in my judgment, the
Act makes no provision whatever for the possibility of rehabilitation: Offenders cannot shorten their
registration or notification period, even on the clearest demonstration of rehabilitation or conclusive
proof of physical incapacitation.”). Other courts have expressed similar concerns. See, e.g., Letalien,
985 A.2d at 23 (“No statistics have been offered to suggest that every registered offender or a
substantial majority of the registered offenders will pose a substantial risk of re-offending long after
they have completed their sentences and probation, including any required treatment. The registry,
however, makes no such distinctions.”); State v. Eppinger, 743 N.E.2d 881, 886 (Ohio 2001) (“One
sexually oriented offense is not a clear predictor of whether that person is likely to engage in the
future in one or more sexually oriented offenses . . . .”).
323. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 382–83 (N.J. 1995) (upholding a retroactive registration
requirement and explaining that part of the rationale for doing so was that the scheme included
individualized assessment); see also State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 585–88 (Ohio 1998) (describing the
hearing to which an offender was entitled).
324. See State ex rel Olivieri v. State, 779 So. 2d 735, 737 (La. 2001) (acknowledging that the
proviso that permitted exclusion from community notification was repealed in 1999); Doe v. Dist.
Att’y, 932 A.2d 552, 563 (Me. 2007) (noting that Maine’s legislature repealed provisions that had
allowed sentencing courts to waive registration requirements in 2001).
325. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 116–17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Doe v. State, 189 P.3d
at 1017 (“[Alaska’s registration scheme] provides no mechanism by which a registered sex offender
can petition the state or a court for relief from the obligations of continued registration and
disclosure.”); Bertram v. State, 2009-Ohio-5210U, ¶ 64 (Ct. App.) (“[T]he offender is not entitled to a
hearing where a judge could make an independent evaluation of the offender’s specific likelihood of
recidivism based on the offender’s criminal history, psychiatric evaluations, age, and facts of the
underlying offense.”).
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that elimination of waiver provisions can have on offenders. As court
documents attest, this citizen of Maine was “a productive citizen” and
“family man” who had no other arrests or convictions for sex offenses
327
following his original conviction twenty years prior. He was “a good
328
candidate” for waiver. But after Maine repealed its waiver provisions,
he no longer had the ability to escape the registration requirements of
329
the state’s sex offender statute.
This Article does not discount the fact that some sex offender
registration statutes formally employ means that might relate rationally
330
enough to the state’s interest in public safety. But as the District Court
for the Southern District of New York warned, “The nature of the
331
classification proceeding carries with it a high risk of error.” One
citizen of Massachusetts received notice that the Massachusetts Sex
Offender Registry Board was reviewing his case to make a
recommendation regarding his duty to register twenty-two years after he
332
had completed probation for a sexual offense. The board recognized
that it could relieve him of the burdens of registration but it nonetheless
refused to grant relief, despite the fact that he had not been convicted of
any crime since he was discharged from probation twenty-two years
333
previously and had been married for twenty-one years, raised three
334
children, and established a stable life in the community.
The failure to provide for individualized assessment of the risk of
reoffense is not the only aspect of super-registration schemes that
renders them excessive. Today’s registration laws include unreasonable

326. See Doe v. Dist. Att’y, 932 A.2d at 563.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1277–78 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that notification was
limited in extent and carefully controlled, with protections against misuses of the information); Doe v.
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 882 N.E.2d 298, 300 (Mass. 2008) (quoting 803 Mass. Code Regs. § 1.01
(2002) (“The Sex Offender Registry Board shall mail to the sex offender a letter notifying him of his
right to submit Documentary Evidence relative to his risk of reoffense, the degree of dangerousness
posed to the public and his duty to register. Any documents submitted by the offender shall become
part of his file as compiled by the Board in making its recommendation. The offender shall submit
such Documentary Evidence to the Board within 30 calendar days of receiving his notification.”)).
331. Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). The court discussed the classification
hearing of one “borderline mentally retarded” offender, who appeared without a lawyer and was not
informed of his right to a lawyer, and at which the hearing examiners read from a document stating the
facts of a different offender’s case. Id. at 475; see Smith v. State, 2009-1765U, p. 7 (La. App. 1 Cir.
3/26/10) (noting that a hearing was never held, even though Louisiana’s sex offender law requires an
offender be given an opportunity to challenge his reclassification).
332. Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 882 N.E.2d at 300.
333. Id.
334. Id.
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reporting and expansive notification requirements that apply to
335
individuals convicted of a broad spectrum of ever-changing crimes.
When viewed individually, the requirements may seem rationally
related to public safety, but when viewed together, registration schemes
paint a picture of excessiveness. As Alaska’s Supreme Court noted, “It is
significant that the registration and re-registration requirements are
336
demanding and intrusive and are of a long duration.” Convicted sex
offenders are required to register for longer periods of time, required to
provide more information than originally contemplated by the first wave
of registration statutes, and are subject to extensive and automatic
337
notification requirements. They have been transformed into a nomadic
subset of the population struggling to find a place to put down roots in
338
light of demanding residency restrictions.
By imposing registration and notification requirements on all
convicted sex offenders, states impliedly communicate to the public that
339
each of those offenders poses a substantial risk to society. Thus, “[a]ll
registrants, including those who have successfully rehabilitated, will
naturally be viewed as potentially dangerous persons by their neighbors,
340
co-workers, and the larger community.” And here lies one key flaw:
Because registration laws and community notification statutes are
overinclusive, they are rendered excessive and consequently punitive.
What has accounted for a difference so fundamental that it shifts the
structure of registration from risk-based to offense-based? While one can
341
point to Congress’s enactment of the AWA in 2006 as the genesis for
the change, this Article argues that the shift actually can be traced to the
Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Connecticut Department of Public
342
343
Safety, which was handed down the same day as Smith v. Doe. There,

335. See supra Part I.C (detailing the extensive changes in registration schemes).
336. Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1017 (Alaska 2008) (footnote omitted).
337. See supra Part I (describing registration and notification burdens).
338. See supra Part I.D.
339. State v. Letalien, 985 A.3d 4, 23 (Me. 2009); see Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind.
2009) (finding the Indiana registration scheme fundamentally flawed, in part because it was “so broad
and sweeping”). Sex offender statutes are also underinclusive in light of their purported purpose
because they do not apply to individuals charged with sexual offenses but are acquitted or to
individuals whose conviction is vacated or overturned. See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d at 1015. At both ends
of the spectrum, sex offender registration laws fail to accomplish their purported goals; Wallace, 905
N.E.2d at 381–83 (noting that a registration scheme that applies to individuals convicted of a sexual
offense and individuals charged with but not convicted of a sexual offense favors a finding that the
scheme is nonpunitive because its application is based on criminal conduct rather than criminal
conviction).
340. Letalien, 985 A.2d at 23. The Letalien court continued, “It is unknown to what extent this
reality will impair the opportunity for rehabilitated offenders to reintegrate and become productive
members of society.” Id. at 23–24.
341. Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and
42 U.S.C. (2010)).
342. 538 U.S. 1, 1 (2003).
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the Court affirmed Connecticut’s decision to include all sex offenders on
a public registry, without regard to individualized risk assessment or
344
danger. The Court wrote, “[T]he fact that respondent seeks to prove—
that he is not currently dangerous—is of no consequence under
345
Connecticut’s Megan’s Law.” Conviction alone triggers registration
346
and Connecticut’s decision to publicly post all
and notification,
registrants’ information, whether dangerous or not, also constituted a
347
valid exercise of its authority.
Although Connecticut Department of Public Safety presented on a
348
narrow ground of procedural due process, the case is, nonetheless,
disturbing for the message it imparts. In upholding a system of sex
offender notification that does not distinguish among registrants, the Court
signaled the constitutional legitimacy of broad-based, overinclusive
registries. The Eighth Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s lead, finding
that categorical application of Iowa’s registration and notification
requirements did not render Iowa’s sex offender statute excessive in
349
relation to its nonpunitive purpose. Classifying an individual as a sex
offender remains automatic even though “one sexually oriented
350
conviction, without more, may not predict future behavior”
Presumed dangerousness is the controlling assumption. The
systematic refusal to assess the relative risk of each offender, or to enable
the registrant to seek waiver or early termination of registration
requirements, warrants reexamination of whether these super-registration
schemes remain rationally connected to their purported goals. Recently,
351
a few courts have criticized the lack of rational connection, but other
343. 538 U.S. 84, 84 (2003).
344. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 3–4; see Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 103–04 (“The Ex
Post Facto Clause does not preclude a State from making reasonable categorical judgments that
conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory consequences.”).
345. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 7 (emphasis added).
346. Id.
347. Id. at 7–8. The Court did leave the door open for a future substantive due process challenge.
See id. at 8 (“[W]e express no opinion as to whether Connecticut’s Megan’s Law violates principles of
substantive due process.”).
348. Id.
349. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 721–22 (8th Cir. 2005) (reasoning that the absence of a
particularized risk assessment did not convert Iowa’s residency restrictions into a punitive measure
because “[t]he Ex Post Facto Clause does not preclude a State from making reasonable categorical
judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory consequences”
(quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 103)).
350. Bertram v. State, 2009-Ohio-5210U, ¶ 24 (Ct. App.) (emphasis added) (quoting State v.
Eppinger, 743 N.E.2d 881, 886 (2001)).
351. See, e.g., State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 1153 (Ind. 2009) (“Restricting the residence of
offenders based on conduct that may have nothing to do with crimes against children, and without
considering whether a particular offender is a danger to the general public, the statute exceeds its nonpunitive purposes.”); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009) (“[W]e think it significant for
this excessiveness inquiry that the Act provides no mechanism by which a registered sex offender can
petition the court for relief from the obligation of continued registration and disclosure. . . . Thus, the
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courts continue to find that sex offender statutes are not excessive in
352
relation to their non-punitive purposes, relying on the Supreme Court’s
assertion in Smith v. Doe that “[a] statute is not deemed punitive simply
because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks to
353
advance.” Yet the Smith reasoning should not persist, because it fails to
address the impact of extensive expansion of regulations on the rational
connection between registration schemes and their purported goals.

IV. Is the Time Ripe for a Successful
Due Process Challenge?
Challenging sex offender registration laws under due process can be
a daunting task—possibly more so than an ex post facto analysis that
relies on the analytical framework of the multifaceted test of Mendoza354
Martinez. A due process challenge faces greater hurdles because of its
355
narrow yet amorphous underpinnings. As the Court wrote in County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, “Rules of due process are not . . . subject to
mechanical application . . . . [O]ur concern with preserving the
constitutional proportions of substantive due process demands an exact
356
analysis of [context and] circumstances . . . .”
A. Making the Case for Substantive Due Process Rights
At its heart, substantive due process was “intended to secure the
357
individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.”
non-punitive purpose of the Act, although of unquestioned importance, does not serve to render as
non-punitive a statute that is so broad and sweeping.”); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 446
(Ky. 2009) (“Given the drastic consequences of Kentucky's residency restrictions, and the fact that
there is no individual determination of the threat a particular registrant poses to public safety, we can
only conclude that [Kentucky’s residency restriction] is excessive with respect to the nonpunitive
purpose of public safety.”); Doe v. Dist. Att’y, 932 A.2d 552, 563 (Me. 2007) (“[T]he fact that a sex
offender never has the ability to escape the registration requirements of the current SORNA,
regardless of behavior, consequences, or contributions following the conviction, strikes us as having
the capability to be excessive and as diverging from the purpose of protecting the public.”).
352. A review of federal case law offers a sobering look at how entrenched the view is that
registration and notification statutes are not punitive. See, e.g., United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 769,
773 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. George, 625 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v.
DiTomasso, 621 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 158–59 (3d Cir.
2010); United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Young, 585 F.3d 199,
203–06 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 466 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1207 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 936 (10th Cir.
2008); United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 919–20 (8th Cir. 2008).
353. 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003).
354. For excellent analyses of all seven factors, see Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 379–84, and State v.
Letalien, 985 A.3d 4, 18–24 (Me. 2009).
355. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952) (iterating that courts must subject
substantive due process claims “to the very narrow scrutiny which the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment authorizes”).
356. 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998) (emphasis added).
357. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) (quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okley, 17 U.S.
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Challenges are difficult to sustain, however, because of the Court’s
unwillingness to expand protections beyond traditional fundamental
358
interests. In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court reiterated, “[W]e
‘ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due
process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this
359
unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.’” Consequently, the
Court has held firm to the proposition that the right asserted must be
360
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” or “implicit in the
361
concept of ordered liberty.”
Legislation that interferes with a fundamental right or liberty will
survive constitutional scrutiny only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a
362
compelling state interest. Without a fundamental interest to anchor the
inquiry, legislation will be deemed constitutional if it is rationally related
363
to a legitimate governmental interest. Successful challenges under the
rational basis test are rare because great deference is afforded to the
364
legislative authority to craft and define laws. Indeed, so difficult is the
burden that scholars evoked surprise when the Court in Lawrence v.
365
Texas overturned a Texas sodomy law without first finding a traditional
366
fundamental interest.
For the sex offender, a substantive due process claim is especially
367
problematic. Registrants can rely on neither sympathy nor case
(4 Wheat) 235, 241 (1819)).
358. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997) (declaring that substantive due
process analysis requires a “‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest” (quoting
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993))).
359. Id. at 720 (alteration in original) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 123
(1992)); see Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) (“The protections of substantive due process
have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right
to bodily integrity.”).
360. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)).
361. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). The Court in Glucksberg found
that the right to end one’s life was not a fundamental one under this test. Id. at 728.
362. Id. at 721.
363. Id.
364. See, e.g., Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The rational basis standard is
‘highly deferential’ and we hold legislative acts unconstitutional under a rational basis standard in only
the most exceptional circumstances.” (citing Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 948 (11th Cir. 2001))).
365. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”).
366. See, e.g., Wilson Huhn, The Jurisprudential Revolution: Unlocking Human Potential in
Grutter and Lawrence, 12 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 65, 65 (2003) (“[T]he opinions of the Supreme
Court in both Lawrence and Grutter work fundamental changes in the interpretation of our
fundamental rights of liberty and equality.”); Kevin F. Ryan, A Flawed Performance, Vt. B.J., Fall
2003, at 5, 6 (“The Court—or at least Justice Kennedy—has chosen to build jurisprudential castles on
the most shifting of sands, if not on thin air.”).
367. See, e.g., Moore, 410 F.3d at 1343–44 (rejecting the registrant’s broad-based and general
assertions of the privacy interests implicated in registering as a sex offender); see also Doe v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 499–502 (6th Cir. 2007) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ substantive due
process claim because it did not allege a sufficient privacy interest); In re W.M., 851 A.2d 431, 451
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precedent for support. Perhaps in recognition of these obstacles,
offenders have been hesitant to bring substantive due process challenges,
370
even when invited to do so. Yet, as observed by the Court in the
landmark decision of Rochin v. California, adherence to substantive due
process principles demands that governmental actions must not offend
“canons of decency and fairness . . . even toward those charged with the
371
most heinous offenses.”
Given the far-ranging burdens of super-registration schemes, a
compelling argument can be made that under their auspices,
governmental conduct no longer comports with traditional notions of
decency and fair play. Members of the Court signaled their openness to
such a challenge during the first generation of sex offender registration
372
laws in Connecticut Department of Public Safety. Justice Souter, with
Justice Ginsburg joining, stated, “[T]oday’s holding does not foreclose a
claim that Connecticut’s dissemination of registry information is
373
actionable on a substantive due process principle.”
Although mindful of the burdens placed on registrants, courts have
nonetheless concluded that the schemes do not offend the canons of
decency and fairness because any penalties associated with registration
and notification mirror the consequences associated with the public’s
374
knowledge of a conviction. Even if that assumption was accurate at one
time, preceding sections of this Article have demonstrated that superregistration schemes no longer abide by the notions of fair play espoused
in Rochin. And although Rochin conjures images of brutal physical
375
methods of government enforcement, it is the concept of overpowering
(D.C. 2004) (“Since SORA does not threaten rights and liberty interests of a ‘fundamental’ order,
appellants cannot succeed on their substantive due process challenge.”).
368. See Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[P]ersons who have been convicted
of serious sex offenses do not have a fundamental right to be free from . . . registration and notification
requirements . . . .”); see also Moore, 410 F.3d at 1344 (emphasizing that a substantive due process
challenge must show that a law either “directly or unduly burden[s] the fundamental rights claimed by
Appellants”).
369. See, e.g., Moore, 410 F.3d at 1342–43 (emphasizing the reluctance to expand substantive due
process protections); People v. Malchow, 714 N.E.2d 583, 589 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (concluding that no
substantive due process violation occurred because the statute “bears a reasonable relationship to a
public interest to be served”); In re Detention of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275, 285 (Iowa 2000) (rejecting a
substantive due process challenge by a sex offender challenging his civil confinement because of the
“reasonable fit between the governmental purpose and the means chosen to advance that purpose”);
Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 421–22 (N.J. 1995) (determining that disclosure of information does not
violate substantive due process).
370. See, e.g., Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (reporting that the
respondents “expressly disavow[ed] any reliance on the substantive component” of due process).
371. 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416–17 (1945)).
372. See 538 U.S. at 9 (Souter, J., concurring).
373. Id.
374. See supra notes 367–69 and accompanying text.
375. In Rochin, the government attempted to extract drugs from the defendant (who had swallowed
them), first by forcible extraction and then by involuntary stomach pumping. See 342 U.S. at 166.
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governmental action that resonates. In Daniels v. Williams, the Court
described the vital role that substantive due process plays in
“prevent[ing] governmental power from being ‘used for purposes of
376
oppression.’” Although Daniels did not concern the constitutionality of
registration schemes, the Daniels description of oppression applies with
equal force to registration schemes.
The demonstration of governmental power is formidable.
Registration burdens should not be viewed as isolated slices of
prohibition; rather, they impact every aspect of life—where to live,
where to work, where to travel, and with whom to associate. Indeed,
there is no aspect of the sex offender’s life untouched by the imprint of
377
registration and notification. With continually increasing burdens, the
inability of registrants to argue for waiver, residency restrictions that bar
the offender from many parts of the country, and a lack of serious and
sustained judicial oversight, registration schemes serve primarily to
enable the government to oppress the sex offender. The counter to such
governmental domination, therefore, lies with the registrant’s ability to
mount a successful due process challenge.

B. Asserting Procedural Due Process Protections
Even where no substantive due process violation exists as a result of
the government’s interference with a registrant’s liberty interest,
procedural due process nonetheless demands safeguards ensuring that
378
the registrant’s liberty is not taken without due process of law. That
379
generally translates to notice and an opportunity to be heard.
In the context of sex offender registration, the deprived liberty
interest required to sustain a procedural due process challenge has been
understood to mean the stigma and alteration of status that attach to
380
registration and public dissemination of that information. Whether, and
to what extent, however, reputation is a protected liberty interest that
triggers procedural due process protections has been the subject of

376. 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1856)).
377. Even courts that have upheld the constitutionality of registration laws nevertheless recognize
that registrants have an affected privacy interest. See Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594, 596–97 (9th Cir.
2004) (acknowledging the liberty interest of sex offenders).
378. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”).
379. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (finding that procedural due process
requires an opportunity for a hearing before welfare benefits are terminated); Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) (“It is clear that failure to give the petitioner notice of the pending adoption
proceedings violated the most rudimentary demands of due process of law.”).
380. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 6 (2003); see also Tandeske, 361 F.3d at
596–97 (acknowledging that sex offenders have an affected liberty interest).

Carpenter_24 (J. Grantz) (Do Not Delete)

1126

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

4/19/2012 6:23 PM

[Vol. 63:1071

381

serious debate. As articulated by the Supreme Court in 1976 in Paul v.
382
Davis, injury to reputation alone is insufficient. Concerned that a
potential flood of federal litigation would arise if a state defamation case
could be converted into an action for loss of liberty under the Due
Process Clause, the Court in Paul concluded that stigma alone is not
383
actionable.
384
And so was born the concept of “stigma plus,” which demands not
only proof of injury to one’s reputation, but also that the injury was
385
accompanied by the denial or curtailment of a tangible interest.
Although numerous cases pay homage to the “plus” part of the stigma386
plus test, courts have also acknowledged that outside Paul’s limited
387
context, “it is not entirely clear what the ‘plus’ is.”

381. Compare Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971) (holding that a state law that
allowed a police chief to prohibit the sale of alcohol to a specified individual was invalid because it put
a person’s “reputation . . . at stake” without notice and an opportunity to be heard), with Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 708 (1976) (holding that Constantineau did not rest on damage to reputation alone but
also on the deprivation of the right to purchase alcohol).
382. 424 U.S. at 701.
383. Id. at 698–99 (expressing concern that without a limitation in place, § 1983 actions would open
the door for a myriad of state defamation claims); see Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991)
(reaffirming Paul in holding that injury to reputation alone was an insufficient liberty interest).
384. See Algarin v. Town of Wallkill, 421 F.3d 137, 138 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005) (tracing the origins of
“stigma plus” to Paul); see Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 211 (2d Cir. 2006) (employing the
term “stigma plus” to describe the plaintiff’s claim); Chisholm v. Ramia, 639 F. Supp. 2d 240, 242 (D.
Conn. 2009) (“[The plaintiff alleges] deprivation of her liberty or property interest under a ‘stigmaplus’ theory . . . .”). For scholarship on the use of the stigma-plus test, see Caroline Louise Lewis, The
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act: An
Unconstitutional Deprivation of the Right to Privacy and Substantive Due Process, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 89, 102 n.83 (1996) (“The net liberty infringement imposed by sex offender laws, together with
the harm to released offenders’ reputations, appears sufficient to satisfy [the] ‘stigma-plus’
requirement.”); Kevin M. McKenna, The Tarkanian Decision: The State of College Athletics Is
Everything but State Action, 40 DePaul L. Rev. 459, 482–83 (1991) (analyzing whether fired athletic
coaches have suffered sufficiently under the stigma-plus test to find a substantive due process
violation).
385. See Herrera v. Union No. 39 Sch. Dist., 975 A.2d 619, 624 (Vt. 2009) (“[N]o liberty-interest
due process claim lies unless the individual experiences both the ‘stigma’ of defamatory statements
and the ‘plus’ of adverse action by the government.”); see also Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 87 (2d Cir.
2005) (defining the stigma-plus test to require injury to reputation coupled with a “state-imposed
burden”); Smith ex rel. Smith v. Siegelman, 322 F.3d, 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003) (iterating that the
stigma-plus test requires proof of stigmatization “in connection with a denial of a right or status
previously recognized under state law”).
386. See, e.g., Patterson v. City of Utica, 370 F.3d 322, 328 (2d Cir. 2004) (employing the test
despite calling it a “still-evolving legal theory”); Jackson v. Heh, No. 98-4420, 2000 WL 761807, at *4
(6th Cir. June 2, 2000) (“[T]he Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals have since embraced
Paul’s ‘stigma-plus’ test.”); Univ. Gardens Apartments Joint Venture v. Johnson, 419 F. Supp. 2d 733,
738 (D. Md. 2006) (“[The challenge is] commonly . . . referred to as a ‘stigma plus’ claim.”).
387. Neu v. Corcoran, 869 F.2d 662, 667 (2d Cir. 1989); see Boone v. Pa. Office of Vocational
Rehab., 373 F. Supp. 2d 484, 497 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (“What satisfies the plus, however, is uncertain.
Generally, the ‘plus’ is a termination of employment.” (quoting Ersek v. Twp. of Springfield, 102 F.3d
79, 83 n.5 (3d Cir. 1996))).
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Where loss of reputation is alleged, litigation centers on whether the
388
stigmatizing statements produce an additional state-imposed burden.
Courts following Paul have narrowly interpreted this requirement, thus
rejecting stigma-plus challenges where there was insufficient proof of an
additional burden. Consequently, claims have been dismissed involving
389
390
loss of goodwill; termination of at-will employment; removal from a
391
bankruptcy panel; a prohibition against adopting a child, which
392
resulted from the defamation; and where a “name-clearing hearing”
393
was later held.
Against this backdrop of jurisprudence, registrants find themselves
battling two fronts—trying to overcome the Court’s reluctance to expand
the notion of what constitutes a protected liberty interest, and addressing
conflicting case law on the proof required for the “plus” in the stigma394
plus test. But Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Paul in
1976, may have foreshadowed this modern procedural due process
challenge when he recalled Justice Stewart’s words from Cafeteria
Workers v. McElroy: “[I]t is to be noted that this is not a case where
government action has operated to bestow a badge of disloyalty or infamy,
395
with an attendant foreclosure from other employment opportunity.” Forty
years later, super-registration schemes have created just the kind of
infamy accompanied by loss of a tangible right to which both Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Stewart referred.
The discussion of procedural due process safeguards in the context of
community notification received short shrift in Connecticut Department of
388. See, e.g., Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 55 (2d Cir. 2001) (observing that
the “plus” required “must at least entail some non-trivial state involvement”), rev’d sub nom. Conn.
Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003); Mosrie v. Barry, 718 F.2d 1151, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(asking whether the appellant was deprived of “some other interest that rises to constitutional
status”).
389. Sadallah v. City of Utica, 383 F.3d 34, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2004); see WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller,
197 F.3d 367, 374–376 (9th Cir. 1999).
390. Silva v. Worden, 130 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1997).
391. Shaltry v. United States, No. 95-15340, 1995 WL 866862, at *5 (9th Cir. June 26, 1995).
392. Behrens v. Regier, 422 F.3d 1255, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that because the plaintiff
had no recognized right under state law to adopt a child, being erroneously labeled a “verified child
abuser” did not deprive him of a liberty interest).
393. Patterson v. City of Utica, 370 F.3d 322, 328 (2d Cir. 2004) (concluding that, although the
name-clearing hearing in this case did not satisfy procedural due process, when properly conducted
such a hearing bars substantive due process claim).
394. Some case law has suggested that the “plus” must be a protected property interest. See, e.g.,
Clark v. Twp. of Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 620 (3d Cir. 1989) (concluding that, because the plaintiff had no
property interest in retaining his duties as a police lieutenant, there was no “alteration or
extinguishment of any right or interest”). Other case law has indicated that less than a property
interest would qualify. See, e.g., Doe v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(explaining that “loss of government employment or a foreclosure of future government employment
opportunities” might suffice to meet the stigma-plus test).
395. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 705 (1976) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961)).
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Public Safety when registrants challenged their inclusion in the
Connecticut online registry without a hearing to determine their
396
individual dangerousness. There, the Court reversed the Second Circuit
to hold that online registry postings did not violate procedural due
process because the inclusion of the registrants was based on their prior
397
convictions and not on their future dangerousness. The Court wrote,
“[D]ue process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is
398
not material to the State’s statutory scheme.” The obvious colorable
fact that swayed the Court was the disclaimer posted on the registry
stating that Connecticut had made “no determination that any individual
399
included in the registry is currently dangerous.”
To be sure, the cost of individualized risk assessment is significant.
And that fact alone may have led to the creation of the Connecticut
model favored by super-registrations schemes. Bolstering the contention
that individualized risk assessment is unnecessary, the Court relied on
the same assumption it did in Smith v. Doe: any consequence that flows
from online dissemination of an offender’s information is no different
than that which generally flows from the public’s knowledge of any
400
conviction. Since the website’s purpose was only to list the information
of all sexual offenders, the Court agreed that there was no need to
401
differentiate the risk levels of the offenders.
But online registries are different. Despite disclaimers or the courts’
402
reliance on them, registrants are at risk for retribution from the
community. Reported cases demonstrate the causal connection between
403
the attacks and the online registries. In 2006, for example, two men
listed on Maine’s sex offender registry were targeted and murdered by a
Canadian man who found the offenders’ personal information on

396. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 3–4 (2003).
397. Id.
398. Id. at 4.
399. Id. at 5 (quoting Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2001).
400. Id. at 7.
401. Id.
402. See, e.g., Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[O]ur inquiry into the law’s
effects cannot consider the possible ‘vigilante’ or illegal responses of citizens to notification. Such
responses are expressly discouraged in the notification itself and will be prosecuted by the state.
Indeed, courts must presume that law enforcement will obey the law and will protect offenders from
vigilantism.” (citation omitted)); see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105 (2003) (noting with approval
the inclusion of a warning that the use of information obtained from Alaska’s online registry to
commit a criminal act against a registrant is subject to criminal prosecution); E.B. v. Verniero,
119 F.3d 1077, 1104 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[E]ach notification is accompanied by a warning against misuse of
the information conveyed and an assurance that any private violence will be prosecuted.”).
403. See, e.g., Man Who Shot at Home of Offender Is Sentenced, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1999, at 44;
see also Small, supra note 3, at 1467–69 (1999) (highlighting incidents of harassment of and violence
against registered sex offenders); Amy L. Van Duyn, The Scarlet Letter Branding: A Constitutional
Analysis of Community Notification Provisions in Sex Offender Statutes, 47 Drake L. Rev. 635, 635–36
(1999) (detailing the harassment and violence that results from community notification).
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Maine’s online registry. Vigilante justice is a realistic concern that
results from publicly labeling individuals as sex or violent offenders and
disseminating their most personal information on the Internet.
And so we stand torn between the need to notify the community of
the presence of dangerous offenders, and awareness of the fact that too
many offenders have been improperly swept into the mix. Let’s assume
for the moment that Connecticut Department of Public Safety offered an
accurate impression of registries at the launch of the global era of
dissemination of information—that a disclaimer on the website was
sufficient to offset any misconceptions regarding the relative danger of
an individual post. Can it be argued convincingly that a disclaimer
continues to afford the registrant sufficient protection, especially in light
of the cascading and devastating consequences that flow from
notification statutes?
One need only consider the civil commitment case law by way of
analogy. There, the deprivation of liberty in the form of a civil
commitment has been upheld as constitutional, in large measure due to
the significant procedural safeguards in place in making the civil
405
commitment determination. In the landmark case Kansas v. Hendricks,
the Supreme Court upheld a Kansas law that allowed the civil
commitment of those who had been deemed sexually violent predators
and who had been convicted of sexually violent offenses or, if not
convicted, had been charged of such offenses but either acquitted or
406
found unable to stand trial because of mental disease or defect. In so
concluding, the Court emphasized that a prior conviction alone is
407
insufficient to trigger civil commitment proceedings. In fact, Justice
Stevens underscored this key point in his dissent in Smith v. Doe when he
stated, “While one might disagree in other respects with Hendricks, it is
clear that a conviction standing alone did not make anyone eligible for
408
the burden imposed by that statute.”
Recasting the model of notification is the first step. Overinclusion—
the Connecticut model—while intended to convey information that is not
discriminatory among sex offenders, is especially problematic for its lack
of discrimination. Under this model, all offenders are viewed as equally

404. Doe v. Dist. Att’y, 932 A.2d 552, 568–69 (Me. 2007) (Alexander & Silver, JJ., concurring)
(“Reports of other murders, assaults, and harassment abound.”).
405. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 352 (1997) (describing the procedures necessary to
initiate commitment).
406. Id. at 357–58 (upholding the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 5929a03(a) (1994)). See Nora V. Demleitner, Abusing State Power or Controlling Risk?: Sex Offender
Commitment and Sicherungverwahrung, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1621 (2003), for a discussion of the
civil commitment of sex offenders and the legitimacy of the state’s authority to control future
dangerousness.
407. Hendricks, 521 U.S at 352.
408. 538 U.S. 84, 113 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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dangerous, and the public, unschooled in the distinctions of varying
levels of registration, condemns them equally. Taking a cue from
Hendricks, therefore, online registries should be reserved for only the
most dangerous of sex offenders—a subclass similar to that actually
409
envisioned by the Court in Hendricks.

V. Enough Is Enough: Three Courts Speak Out
As this Article has demonstrated, super-registration schemes have
flourished with relative impunity. Despite legislation that includes
harsher registration and notification burdens, the inability of registrants
to contest classification, and retroactive application to previously
convicted offenders, courts maintain that these registration schemes are,
410
nonetheless, civil regulatory laws.
But times might be changing. Slowly, courts have begun to
appreciate the devastating picture painted by current sex offender
registration laws. In a relatively short timeframe, the supreme courts of
Indiana, Maine, and Ohio have said, “Enough is enough.” Each court
reached the conclusion that its state’s serially amended scheme is no
411
longer worthy of the designation “civil regulation.” In State v. Williams,
the Supreme Court of Ohio summed up well this dawning realization:
No one change compels our conclusion that [the new registration
scheme] is punitive. . . . When we consider all the changes enacted by
[Senate Bill] 10 in aggregate, we conclude that imposing the current
registration requirements on a sex offender whose crime was
412
committed prior to the enactment of [Senate Bill] 10 is punitive.

A review of the Ohio Supreme Court’s jurisprudence serves to
illustrate the court’s transition from its finding that the state’s
registration laws were constitutionally regulatory to its discovery of their
unconstitutionally punitive nature, a transition that mirrors the judicial
413
414
evolutions that have occurred in Maine and Indiana. Ohio’s version
415
of Megan’s Law was first enacted in 1996. As early as 1998, the statute

409. 521 U.S. at 357 (stressing that civil commitment was only intended for “a limited subclass of
dangerous persons”).
410. See supra note 352 (reviewing federal court decisions concluding that sex offender statutes are
civil regulations).
411. See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 378 (Ind. 2009); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 26 (Me.
2009); State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011).
412. 952 N.E.2d at 1113.
413. See Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 384 (concluding that, as amended, Indiana’s Sex Offender and
Registration Act no longer is rationally connected to its civil purpose and therefore violates ex post
facto principles); see also Hevner v. State, 919 N.E.2d 109 (Ind. 2010) (finding that retroactive
application of Indiana’s amended registration scheme to a newly incorporated sex offense violates ex
post facto principles).
414. See Letalien, 985 A.2d at 24–26 (determining that Maine’s serially amended registration
scheme no longer is constitutional).
415. Williams, 952 N.E.2d at 1110.
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was challenged in State v. Cook as a violation of the prohibition against
416
ex post facto legislation. However, Ohio’s Supreme Court found that
the statute “serve[d] the solely remedial purpose of protecting the
417
public.” The Cook court reasoned that the registration and address
verification procedures were “de minimis procedural requirements”
418
necessary to achieve the statute’s remedial goals. And this was the logic
419
to which the Ohio Supreme Court clung for over fourteen years. Even
after the statute was “significantly amended” by Senate Bill 5, the court
420
continued to rely on Cook.
But when addressing Senate Bill 10, which further modified Ohio’s
registration scheme in 2007, Ohio’s highest court appreciated that it was
faced with a dramatically altered statutory scheme. Comparing the
significant changes effected by Senate Bill 10 to the requirements of its
predecessor Senate Bill 5, the Williams court paints a picture of excessive
421
regulation. No longer convinced that Ohio’s statute was remedial, even
though some elements of it remain so, the court determined that, in the
aggregate, the scheme was punitive and thus violated ex post facto
principles when applied to an offender convicted prior to the Bill’s
422
enactment.
Neither one change, nor one amendment, nor one alteration
compelled the court’s conclusion in Williams: “It is a matter of degree
whether a statute is so punitive that its retroactive application is
423
Williams does not inhibit the Ohio General
unconstitutional.”
Assembly’s authority to pass legislation in order to protect the public
424
from sex offenders within the confines of the state’s constitution.
416. 700 N.E.2d 570, 573 (Ohio 1998).
417. Id. at 585.
418. Id. at 578.
419. See, e.g., State v. Eppinger, 743 N.E.2d 881, 888 (Ohio 2001) (upholding Ohio’s sex offender
registration statute and stressing the importance of statutorily provided classification hearings and the
significance of classifying an offender appropriately); State v. Williams, 728 N.E.2d 342, 355 (Ohio
2000) (holding that Ohio’s sex offender statute constituted “reasonable legislation” despite the impact
it had on the lives of sex offenders because it “addresses legitimate governmental interests without a
detrimental effect on individual constitutional rights”).
420. Williams, 952 N.E.2d at 1111; see, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 896 N.E.2d 110, 118–19 (Ohio 2008),
(holding that Ohio’s statute did not violate the ban on retroactive legislation because Senate Bill 5 did
not alter the essentially regulatory purpose of the statute established in Cook, even if it made more
burdensome the registration requirements and more extensive the notification provisions); State v.
Wilson, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶¶ 1270–71 (Ohio 2007) (relying on Cook in finding that Ohio’s sex offender
statute did not constitute ex post facto legislation because the legislation was remedial and was a
reasonable measure designed to protect the public). But see State v. Williams, 868 N.E.2d 969, 971
(Ohio 2007) (reasoning that the court of appeals’ reliance on Cook was misplaced in this case because
the “simple” registration and notification at issue in Cook had been amended to make an offender’s
failure to verify his current address a crime).
421. 952 N.E.2d at 1112–13.
422. Id. at 1113.
423. Id. (citing Cook, 700 N.E.2d at 582).
424. Id.
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Similarly, neither the Supreme Court of Indiana’s decision in Wallace v.
State nor the Supreme Court of Maine’s decision in State v. Letalien
questions a legislature’s ability to institute a registration system in order
425
to protect the public. Instead, these decisions serve as a reminder that
spiraling amendments can undermine the civil regulatory aim of a
426
registration scheme.

Conclusion
So where does that leave us? It may feel good—even righteous—to
single out sex offenders for particular treatment in an effort to protect
the community. But history has shown that a collective response to a
national problem concerning safety and security does not necessarily
427
make it the right one. This Article demonstrates that ramped-up
registration schemes, designed to appease a fearful public, are no longer
rationally connected to their regulatory purpose, thus transforming the
legislation into criminal penalties cloaked in civil rhetoric.
Recent stirrings in state courts offer hope of retrenchment. Wallace,
Letalien, and Williams have filled a judicial void with articulate analysis
of the evolution of the schemes’ unconstitutionality. Yet one must be
mindful that, at least in the case of Wallace and Williams, these holdings
rested on state, rather than federal, constitutional grounds. Collectively,
then, these cases may prove inadequate to command a paradigmatic shift
in the public and legislative response to the perceived dangers of sex
offenders.
Seminal Supreme Court decisions remind us that sometimes only
the highest court can redirect the national conversation and bring about
428
change in national behavior. It is time to reexamine Smith v. Doe and
Connecticut Department of Public Safety and their attendant assumptions.
Most important, it is time to provide meaningful guidance on the
parameters that will support the states’ interest in keeping their
communities safe while providing constitutional protections to offenders.
425. See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 383 (Ind. 2009); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 26 (Me.
2009).
426. Even prior to Senate Bill 10’s enactment, Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger recognized the
significant restraint on liberty imposed by Ohio’s sex offender statute and argued that it was punitive.
State v. Ferguson, 896 N.E.2d 110, 122–24 (Ohio 2008) (Lanzinger, J. dissenting).
427. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–16 (1944) (describing the United
States’ decision to force Japanese-Americans into internment camps during World War II). As Justice
Thurgood Marshall observed, “History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of
urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.” Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
428. Throughout the Court’s jurisprudence, there are a number of noteworthy cases that changed
the national conversation. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (redefining liberty to
include sexual autonomy); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966) (changing the practice of
police interrogations); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954) (declaring the importance of
moving beyond basic facts “to the effect of segregation itself on public education”).
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The dissenting words of Judge Damon Keith in Doe v. Bredesen ring
especially true in light of the current legislative landscape: “We must be
careful, in our rush to condemn one of the most despicable crimes in our
society, not to undermine the freedom and constitutional rights that
429
make our nation great.”

429. 521 F.3d 680, 681 (6th Cir. 2008) (Keith, J., dissenting).
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